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1. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88
Stat. 829 (1974) (codified as amended in scattered sections of the United States Code, including
29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1461, and the Internal Revenue Code).
2. For a discussion of the purposes of ERISA, see infra notes 73–78 and accompanying text.
3. See, e.g., Moore v. Capitalcare, Inc., 461 F.3d 1, 9–11 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (holding that a
plan beneficiary must reimburse the plan even though the plan beneficiary was not made whole);
Bombardier Aerospace Employee Welfare Benefits Plan v. Ferrer, Poirot and Wansbrough, 354
F.3d 348, 360–62 (5th Cir. 2003) (refusing to impose the common fund doctrine which would
require the plan to pay its fair share of attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in recovering the funds);
Walker v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. 159 F.3d 938, 940–41 (5th Cir. 1998) (requiring the plan
participant to pay the plan the entire settlement amount even though she had not been made whole
 VI. CONSTRUING “APPROPRIATE EQUITABLE RELIEF” AS RELIEF
CONSISTENT WITH THE COMMON FUND DOCTRINE. . . . . . . . . . . 89
VII. CONCLUSION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Imagine that you sustain brain injury when your car collides with
another vehicle. You incur $1 million in medical expenses, which your
employee welfare benefit plan, governed by the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), covers.  You will never be able to1
work again and are likely to suffer from physical and emotional pain for
the rest of your life. You sue the driver of the other vehicle in state court
for negligence, seeking $6 million in damages—$3 million for the present
net value of your future lost wages, $2 million for past and future physical
and emotional pain and suffering, and $1 million for past medical
expenses. You settle with the other driver for $1 million—the limit of
liability under his automobile liability insurance—in large part because he
has no unencumbered assets with which to satisfy any judgment.
As soon as you receive your settlement proceeds, the fiduciary of your
ERISA plan sues you in federal court for reimbursement of the $1 million
in medical benefits the plan paid on your behalf. The court orders you to
pay the $1 million in settlement proceeds to your ERISA plan, even
though you were not made whole as a result of your tort lawsuit.
Moreover, the court rules that the ERISA plan is not required to pay one
cent to your lawyer. You realize that you have gotten absolutely no net
benefit from your ERISA plan, that you wasted substantial time pursuing
the negligence case, and that you may still owe your lawyer a contingency
fee that you will have to pay out of your own pocket.
This result hardly seems fair, particularly given that ERISA was
enacted to protect the interests of plan participants and their beneficiaries
and to assure the equitable nature of employee benefit plans.  Yet, this2
result would be compelled by existing precedent in many federal courts.3
2
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and ruling that the plan did not have to pay any of the attorneys’ fees). For a case in which
reimbursement was particularly inequitable, see Walker v. Rose, 22 F. Supp. 2d 343, 345 (D.N.J.
1998). There, a nine-year-old boy sustained second- and third-degree burns over most of his body
when an aerosol can exploded after being thrown into a fire. Id. The boy was covered as a
dependent under an ERISA-governed plan that paid more than $1.2 million for medical expenses.
Id. The boy sued the allegedly responsible parties in state court and his lawyers negotiated a
$600,000 settlement. Id. When the plan brought suit to enforce its reimbursement right, the court
ruled that the plan was entitled to the entire $600,000, leaving the boy and his attorneys with none
of the tort recovery. Id.
4. For a discussion of state common fund doctrines and statutes, see infra notes 65–72 and
accompanying text.
5. Most states have adopted the “made-whole” rule, which prohibits an insurer from
recovering subrogation or reimbursement until the insured has been completely compensated for
all injuries, and several such states have held that insurers cannot contract out of the made-whole
rule. See GARY L. WICKERT, ERISA AND HEALTH INSURANCE SUBROGATION IN ALL 50 STATES
§§ 2.08, 3.18[2] (2d ed. 2006) (observing that most states apply the made-whole rule and that only
a minority of jurisdictions allow contract language to override the made-whole rule); see, e.g.,
Franklin v. Healthsource of Ark., 942 S.W.2d 837, 839–840 (Ark. 1997); Davis v. Kaiser Found.
Health Plan, 521 S.E.2d 815, 818 (Ga. 1999); Wine v. Globe Am. Cas. Co., 917 S.W.2d 558, 565
(Ky. 1996); Hare v. State, 733 So. 2d 277, 284 (Miss. 1999); Blue Cross & Blue Shield, Inc. v.
Dailey, 687 N.W.2d 689, 699 (Neb. 2004); York v. Sevier County Ambulance Auth., 8 S.W.3d 616,
621 (Tenn. 1999); Rimes v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 316 N.W.2d 348, 353 (Wis. 1982).
Many states have anti-subrogation statutes or administrative regulations completely prohibiting or
limiting an insurer’s ability to recover subrogation or reimbursement. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT.
§ 52-225c (2008) (prohibiting subrogation and reimbursement); GA. CODE ANN. § 33-24-56.1
(2008) (limiting subrogation to cases in which the insured has been made whole); IND. CODE § 34-
51-2-19 (2008) (limiting subrogation and reimbursement); KAN. ADMIN. REGS. § 40-1-20 (2008)
(prohibiting subrogation); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 2729-A (2008) (limiting subrogation);
MINN. STAT. § 62A.095 (2008) (limiting subrogation to cases in which the insured has been made
whole); 11 N.C. ADMIN. CODE 12.0319 (2008) (prohibiting subrogation); VA. CODE. ANN.
§ 38.2-3405 (2008) (prohibiting subrogation).
6. See Roger M. Baron, Public Policy Considerations Warranting Denial of Reimbursement
to ERISA Plans: It’s Time to Recognize the Elephant in the Courtroom, 55 MERCER L. REV. 595,
596 (2004) (observing that, “[l]itigation over reimbursement abounds”); Ellen E. Schultz, Health
Plans Put the Bite on Some Cash Settlements, WALL ST. J., Sept. 20, 1994, at C1 (discussing
increased litigation over subrogation clauses). Many plans also require reimbursement when the
plan participant recovers from a third party other than a tortfeasor, such as an insurer that provides
uninsured and/or underinsured motorist coverage. See, e.g., Primax Recoveries, Inc. v. Young, 83
F. App’x 523, 525–26 (4th Cir. 2003) (authorizing a plan administrator to seek reimbursement from
uninsured motorist coverage proceeds).
Had your claim been governed solely by state law, the common fund
doctrine would likely have required the plan to pay its fair share of your
attorneys’ fees and costs.  In addition, state law may well have limited or4
prohibited the plan’s recovery either through an anti-subrogation statute
or the common law “made-whole” rule.5
In recent years, ERISA-governed employee welfare benefit plans have
aggressively pursued recoupment in cases where an injured plan
participant recovers medical expenses from a tortfeasor.  Typically, plans6
3
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7. For example, some policies or plans contain provisions such as the following:
This subrogation provision applies when you are sick or injured as a result of the
act or omission of another person or party. Subrogation means the Company’s
right to recover any payments made to you or your dependent by a third party or
any insurer acting in place of, or on behalf of a third party or a third party’s
insurer, because of an injury or illness caused by a third party. Third party means
another person or organization. 
If you or your dependent receives benefits and have a right to recover damages
from a third party, the Company is subrogated to this right. All recoveries from
a third party (whether by lawsuit, settlement, or otherwise) must be used to
reimburse the Company . . . for benefits paid. Any remainder will be yours or your
dependents. The Company’s share of the recovery will not be reduced because
you or your dependent has not received the full damages claimed, unless the
Company agrees in writing to a reduction. 
Mid Atl. Med. Servs., Inc. v. Sereboff, 303 F. Supp. 2d 691, 697–98 (D. Md. 2004), aff’d in part,
vacated in part, and remanded, 407 F.3d 212 (4th Cir. 2005), aff’d, 547 U.S. 356 (2006).
8. See, e.g., Bishop v. Burgard, 764 N.E.2d 24, 28 (Ill. 2002) (stating the plan at issue
provided that “‘[a]ll attorney’s fees and court costs are the responsibility of the participant, not the
Plan.’”). 
9. See THOMAS H. LAWRENCE & JOHN M. RUSSELL, ERISA SUBROGATION 3 (American
Bar Association 2000) (urging plan fiduciaries to view recoupment “as essential . . . [to] their
overall cost containment efforts”); Mark A. Hofmann, Health Plan Wins Fight Over Costs
Recovery; Ruling Benefits Employers, BUS. INS., May 22, 2006, at 1 (quoting a representative of
the manufacturing industry as stating that “‘reimbursements are vital to the ability of health plans
to try to keep up with rising health-care costs’”).
10. See Scott M. Aronson, ERISA’s Equitable Illusion: The Unjust Justice of Section
502(a)(3), 9 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 247, 281–89 (2005) (arguing in Part V that insurers do not
consider subrogation when setting insurance rates and that unchecked reimbursement unfairly
deprives the tort victim of the right to full compensation); Baron, supra note 6, at 620–31 (same);
Karen Ertel, Insurer May Take Share of Damages Award, Supreme Court Rules, TRIAL, July 2006,
at 92, 92 (quoting a trial lawyer as saying that lawyers “‘simply will walk away’” from personal
include provisions entitling the plan to full reimbursement from any
recovery the plan participant receives, irrespective of the amount actually
received by the plan participant for medical expenses and irrespective of
whether the plan participant is fully compensated for all injuries.  Some7
plans also contain provisions requiring the plan participant to pay all
attorneys’ fees incurred in the litigation against the third-party tortfeasor.8
Such provisions are intended to give the plan’s claim for recoupment full
priority so that every dollar received by the plan participant from a third
party will go to the plan until the plan has been fully reimbursed. While
some commentators claim these aggressive recoupment attempts are
necessary to contain the cost of employee welfare benefit plans,  others9
argue that the cost savings from recoupment are negligible and further
argue that such provisions fail to take into account the relative equities
between the parties, thwart the civil justice system’s ability to compensate
injuries, and render many tort cases against negligent third parties
economically unfeasible.  10
4
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injury cases involving potentially large claims for reimbursement under ERISA); see also Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc. Assocs.’ Health & Welfare Plan v. Wells, 213 F.3d 398, 402 (7th Cir. 2000) (arguing
that the “prospect [that a plan will not have to pay its fair share of attorneys’ fees] might well deter
a suit likely to result in a judgment or settlement not much larger than the benefits available under
the plan—and in that event the language on which the plan relies would produce
undercompensation for harms that were unrelated to the type of harm to which the benefits
pertain”).
11. 547 U.S. 356 (2006).
12. See Thomas R. McLean & Edward P. Richards, The Ruling in ‘Sereboff,’ NAT’L L.J.,
Aug. 21, 2006, at 13, 13 (predicting that, after Sereboff, “ERISA health plans will be much more
aggressive in asserting claims for reimbursement . . . .”); Peter H. Wayne, IV & Mark R. Taylor,
Beware the ERISA Health Plan Lien, TRIAL, Dec. 2007, at 48, 49 (observing that “Sereboff has
emboldened ERISA plan administrators everywhere”).
13. Section 502(a)(3) authorizes a plan fiduciary to bring a claim for “appropriate equitable
relief” to enforce plan provisions requiring subrogation or reimbursement. ERISA § 502(a)(3), 29
U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (2006). For purposes of § 502(a)(3), “equitable relief” excludes legal relief and
means “those categories of relief that were typically available in equity (such as injunction,
mandamus, and restitution, but not compensatory damages).” Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S.
248, 256 (1993). For a discussion of why plans must bring their reimbursement claims pursuant to
§ 502(a)(3) of ERISA rather than asserting breach of contract claims based on state law, see infra
Part IV.B.
14. See Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 213–15 (2002)
(prohibiting the plan’s claim for reimbursement because it was a legal claim for money damages
rather than an equitable claim for recovery of particular funds in the possession of the defendant);
Primax Recoveries, Inc. v. Sevilla, 324 F.3d 544, 548 (7th Cir. 2003) (finding that the claim
asserted by an ERISA fiduciary was for legal rather than equitable relief); Westaff (USA) Inc. v.
Arce, 298 F.3d 1164, 1166–67 (9th Cir. 2002), abrogated by Sereboff, 547 U.S. at 356 (holding that
an ERISA administrator’s claim was not a claim for equitable relief where the funds sought were
in an escrow account); Bauhaus USA, Inc. v. Copeland, 292 F.3d 439, 444–45 (5th Cir. 2002)
(finding that the claim for reimbursement was not a claim for equitable relief where the funds
sought were in the registry of the court). 
15. Sereboff, 547 U.S. at 363. The Court’s two-prong analysis is substantially consistent with
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Sereboff v. Mid Atlantic
Medical Services, Inc.  will likely encourage ERISA-governed plans to11
assert claims for reimbursement more aggressively.  Prior to Sereboff,12
plans were often unsuccessful in recovering reimbursement, in large part
because § 502(a)(3) of ERISA limits the relief available to a plan seeking
reimbursement to “appropriate equitable relief” necessary to redress a
violation of plan provisions requiring reimbursement or subrogation.  In13
several cases, plans attempted to satisfy this requirement by arguing that,
in attempting to recover reimbursement, they were essentially trying to
impose a constructive trust on funds held by the plan participant. Many
such claims failed, however, either because the plan participant no longer
had the funds or because the plan was really seeking an award of money
damages rather than equitable relief.14
In Sereboff, however, the Court held that the claim for reimbursement
at issue was a claim for “equitable relief” under § 502(a)(3) because both
the nature of the relief sought and the basis for the claim were equitable.15
5
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its jurisprudence concerning a party’s Seventh Amendment right to jury trial. The Court has held
that a party is entitled to a jury trial in suits where legal rights, rather than equitable rights, are
determined. Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers, Local No. 391, 494 U.S. 558, 564 (1990). In order
to determine whether legal rights are at stake in a particular case, the court must first examine the
nature of the claim by determining whether analogous eighteenth century claims were tried at law
or in equity. Id. at 565. Second, the court must determine whether the remedy sought “is legal or
equitable in nature.” Id. (citing Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 417–18 (1987)).
16. Sereboff, 547 U.S. at 362–63.
17. Id.
18. 534 U.S. 204 (2002).
19. Id. at 220.
20. See infra notes 95–98 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 159–61 and accompanying text.
22. 538 U.S. 329 (2003).
23. Id. at 341–42.
24. See infra notes 203–14 and accompanying text for a discussion of how the Miller test
broadened the scope of the savings clause.
The Court held that the relief sought—recovery of particular funds in the
possession of the Sereboffs—was equitable in nature.  In addition, the16
Court found that the claim that plan language created an equitable lien by
agreement was a claim that sounded in equity.  Thus, the Court’s holding17
that plans may recover reimbursement under § 502(a)(3) when the
underlying facts support the existence of an equitable lien by
agreement provides an additional basis upon which plans may pursue
reimbursement.
Even though the Sereboff opinion supplies some clarity as to what
constitutes a claim for “equitable relief” pursuant to § 502(a)(3), the
assertion of subrogation and reimbursement claims continues to raise
issues that have not been uniformly resolved. For example, in Great-West
Life & Annuity Insurance Co. v. Knudson,  the Supreme Court18
acknowledged, but did not resolve, the issue of whether ERISA preempts
state-law actions for reimbursement or subrogation.  Lower courts have19
failed to resolve this issue in a consistent manner.20
A similar issue is whether ERISA preempts state common fund
doctrines. Some lower courts have found state common fund doctrines
have been expressly preempted while others have not.  Further21
complicating the question is the possibility that some state laws requiring
insurers to pay a pro rata share of attorneys’ fees are contained in anti-
subrogation statutes that fall within the scope of ERISA’s express
preemption clause but may nevertheless be saved from preemption
because they regulate insurance.
In Kentucky Association of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller,  the Supreme22
Court established a new test for determining whether state laws regulate
insurance and are therefore saved from preemption by ERISA’s savings
clause.  Even though the Miller test broadened the scope of the savings23
clause,  at least one lower court has recently applied the test in a manner24
6
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25. See infra Part V.B.
26. Sereboff v. Mid Atl. Med. Servs., Inc., 547 U.S. 356, 368 (2006). 
27. Id. at 368 n.2. 
28. Issues concerning an ERISA-governed plan’s ability to recover subrogation or
reimbursement are likely to continue to arise given that in 2002 approximately 137 million people
were covered by employer-sponsored health care plans governed by ERISA. Brief for Secretary of
Labor as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellant’s Petition for En Banc Rehearing, Qualchoice, Inc.
v. Rowland, 367 F.3d 638 (6th Cir. 2004) (No. 02-3614), 2004 WL 3769987, at *13.
29. 1 DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES-EQUITY-RESTITUTION § 4.3(4) (2d ed.
1993).
inconsistent with congressional intent to save state laws regulating
insurance from preemption.25
Yet another issue is whether appropriate equitable relief under
§ 502(a)(3) should be interpreted as relief consistent with equitable
principles such as the common fund doctrine.  The Court recognized this26
issue in Sereboff, but did not resolve it. Because the Sereboffs had not
properly raised the issue below,  the Court refused to address their27
argument that equitable relief is not “appropriate” unless consistent with
other equitable principles such as the made-whole rule and the common
fund doctrine.
This Article attempts to resolve many of these issues, not only to
clarify the law and facilitate its just interpretation, but also to provide plan
participants and their counsel with some certainty so they can evaluate the
value of the plan participant’s tort claim against third parties.  Part II of28
this Article explains subrogation and reimbursement. Part III of this
Article explores the historical origins of the common fund doctrine and
examines its modern application by the states. Part IV argues that ERISA
preempts state-law claims for subrogation and reimbursement, making
§ 502(a)(3) claims for “appropriate equitable relief” the only mechanism
by which plan fiduciaries may enforce subrogation or reimbursement
provisions. Part V analyzes whether state common fund doctrines or
statutes codifying the doctrine apply to § 502(a)(3) claims and concludes
that many state common fund doctrines and statutes are not preempted,
either because they do not fall within the scope of the express preemption
clause or because they are laws regulating insurance and are therefore
saved from preemption. Part VI concludes by urging courts to interpret
“appropriate equitable relief” as relief consistent with the common fund
doctrine.
II.  SUBROGATION AND REIMBURSEMENT
A.  Equitable Subrogation
Equitable subrogation arises by law, while contractual subrogation
arises as a result of contract language.  The equitable right to subrogation29
7
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33. See 4 GEORGE E. PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION § 23.1, at 344 (1978).
34. Subrogation also furthers the principle of indemnity in that it prevents an insured from
receiving a windfall. See ROBERT H. JERRY, II & DOUGLAS R. RICHMOND, UNDERSTANDING
INSURANCE LAW § 96[a] (4th ed., Matthew Bender & Co. 2007).
35. See id. In this way, subrogation also ensures that the primarily liable defendant is not
unjustly enriched by being relieved of liability. See PALMER, supra note 33, § 23.1, at 344.
36. See JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 34, § 96[b].
37. See JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 34, § 96[d][i]; PALMER, supra note 33, § 23.1, at
344. Most states apply the made-whole rule to equitable claims for subrogation. See WICKERT,
supra note 5, § 2.08.
38. See infra notes 66–72 and accompanying text.
arises when one pays the debt of another who is primarily liable for that
debt.  The one who paid the debt may then “[step] into the [creditor’s]30
shoes” and assert the creditor’s claims against the party who is primarily
liable.  The subrogated party may recover from the primarily liable party31
only to the extent the creditor could have recovered on the same claim.32
For example, assume that Sally, an automobile passenger, was injured
in a car wreck caused by the negligence of John, the driver. Further
assume that Sally’s health insurer paid her medical expenses. Sally’s
health insurer may then step into Sally’s shoes and assert Sally’s claim for
those medical expenses against John, the primarily liable party.
Subrogation evolved as an equitable remedy to prevent unjust
enrichment.  If Sally were permitted to recover from both the health33
insurer and the tortfeasor for the same medical expenses, Sally would be
unjustly enriched by the double recovery.  Subrogation also ensures that34
ultimate liability falls on the legally responsible party—John, the negligent
driver—rather than the health insurer.  Therefore, subrogation ensures a35
just result by preventing the insured from receiving a windfall and
allocating ultimate liability to the negligent tortfeasor.
A claim for equitable subrogation, however, will be defeated or limited
when other equitable principles, such as the made-whole rule, the common
fund doctrine, laches or unclean hands, prohibit relief.  The made-whole36
rule prohibits subrogation if the insured has not been fully compensated
for her injuries because such an insured has not been unjustly enriched.37
Similarly, equitable principles require application of the common fund
doctrine to prevent the unjust enrichment of insurers that would result if
insurers were permitted to recover subrogation without paying a fair share
of attorneys’ fees.38
B.  Contractual Subrogation and Reimbursement
True subrogation provisions authorize the insurer to step into
the insured’s shoes to pursue his rights against the tortfeasor. In
8
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39. LAWRENCE & RUSSELL, supra note 9, at 4; John R. Cella, Jr., The Pursuit of Proceeds
by Plans, Participants and Plaintiffs’ Lawyers: Dissonant Solutions to an Alliterative Problem, 22
CAMPBELL L. REV. 317, 319–23 (2000). 
40. For an example, see the policy language quoted in supra note 7.
41. Id.
42. For an example, see the policy language quoted in supra note 7.
43. See infra notes 66–72 and accompanying text.
44. See WICKERT, supra note 5, § 3.18[2] (observing that a majority of jurisdictions refuse
to allow contract language to override the made-whole rule). For cases in which state courts have
so refused, see supra note 5.
45. See DOBBS, supra note 29, § 3.10(2); WICKERT, supra note 5, § 2.09. 
46. See John P. Dawson, Lawyers and Involuntary Clients: Attorney Fees From Funds, 87
HARV. L. REV. 1597, 1601–12 (1974); Johnny Parker, The Common Fund Doctrine: Coming of Age
in the Law of Insurance Subrogation, 31 IND. L. REV. 313, 316–20 (1998).
47. 105 U.S. 527 (1881).
48. Id. at 528.
49. Id. 
50. Id. at 529. 
comparison, reimbursement provisions give rise to a contract claim against
the insured for reimbursement after the insured has recovered from the
tortfeasor.  In an effort to secure recoupment where equitable subrogation39
would be barred, many insurance policies and employee welfare benefit
plans include language authorizing subrogation even when the insured has
not been made whole.  Many insurance policies and benefit plans also40
obligate the insured, plan participant, or beneficiary to reimburse the
insurer or plan for covered medical expenses regardless of whether she has
been made whole.  In addition, some policies and plans expressly41
disclaim the common fund doctrine.  Yet, on public policy grounds, state42
courts have frequently applied the common fund doctrine to subrogation
and reimbursement claims  and have also refused to enforce policy43
provisions requiring full reimbursement to the insurer.44
III.  THE COMMON FUND DOCTRINE
A.  Historical Origins of the Common Fund Doctrine
The common fund doctrine requires that one who passively benefits
from a fund created or preserved through litigation must share the cost of
the litigation.  The development of the common fund doctrine in federal45
court can largely be traced to three opinions.46
First, in Trustees v. Greenough,  Francis Vose, a bondholder, sued the47
trustees of a fund out of which the bondholders were to be paid.  Vose48
sued on his own behalf and on behalf of other bondholders.  The49
litigation, which was completely financed by Vose, increased the value of
the fund to the benefit of all bondholders.  The Supreme Court affirmed50
9
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51. Id. at 532.
52. Id. at 536–37.
53. 113 U.S. 116 (1885).
54. Id. at 120. 
55. Id. at 118–20.
56. Id. at 124.
57. Id. at 124–25.
58. Id. at 127.
59. 307 U.S. 161 (1939).
60. Id. at 164–65.
61. Id. at 162–63.
62. Id. at 163.
the lower court’s award of costs, expenses and attorneys’ fees to Vose,
concluding:
It would not only be unjust to him, but it would give to the
other parties entitled to participate in the benefits of the fund
an unfair advantage. He has worked for them as well as for
himself; and if he cannot be reimbursed out of the fund itself,
they ought to contribute their due proportion of the expenses
which he has fairly incurred. To make them a charge upon the
fund is the most equitable way of securing such
contribution.51
The Court observed that the award to Vose was consistent with “the
principles of equity and justice.”52
Second, in Central Railroad & Banking Co. v. Pettus,  the attorneys,53
rather than the client, directly asserted a claim for attorneys’ fees.  The54
lawyers had filed suit on behalf of a class of unsecured creditors seeking
to have their mortgages declared superior to those of other unsecured
creditors.  The suit resulted in a lien upon certain property, thereby55
bringing such property within the control of the lower court.  In affirming56
the lower court’s award of attorneys’ fees, the Court held that an award of
attorneys’ fees out of the common fund could be made directly to the
attorneys.  In response to the passive creditors’ arguments that they had57
no contract with the lawyers, the Court reasoned that those who had
“accepted the fruits of the [lawyers’] labors” should “contribute to the
expenses.”58
Third, in Sprague v. Ticonic National Bank,  the Court emphasized59
that the award of attorneys’ fees was within a court’s historic equitable
power.  Sprague sued on her own behalf and successfully asserted a lien60
upon the proceeds of certain bonds.  She then argued that, in doing so, she61
had established the right of others similarly situated to assert a similar lien
by virtue of stare decisis.  The Court held that even though Sprague did62
not purport to represent the entire class and did not automatically create a
10
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63. Id. at 166–67.
64. Id. at 167.
65. See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 45 (1991) (citing Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co.
v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 257–58 (1975)).
66. See ROBERT L. ROSSI, ATTORNEYS’ FEES § 7:20 (3d ed. 2002) (collecting cases);
WICKERT, supra note 5, §§ 2.09, 3.01–3.51 (observing that the majority of states have adopted the
common fund doctrine and examining the application of the rule in all fifty states); Parker, supra
note 46, at 337–38 (observing that all but two states have adopted the rule); see, e.g., Edwards v.
Alaska Pulp Corp., 920 P.2d 751, 755 (Alaska 1996) (stating that the “common fund doctrine is a
fee-spreading mechanism which prevents unjust enrichment of those who derive benefit from the
efforts of others”); Scholtens v. Schneider, 671 N.E.2d 657, 665 (Ill. 1996) (noting that the doctrine
is based “upon equitable considerations of quantum meruit and the prevention of unjust
enrichment”).
67. See Parker, supra note 46, at 337–38 (calculating that twenty states have specifically
applied the common fund doctrine to insurance subrogation while the remaining states that have
adopted the common fund doctrine have not specifically addressed its application to insurance
subrogation).
68. See DOBBS, supra note 29, § 3.10(2); Parker, supra note 46, at 322.
69. See DOBBS, supra note 29, § 3.10(2).
70. See Parker, supra note 46, at 323 & n.54. For a discussion of how attorneys’ fees are and
should be calculated in class action cases, see generally R. Eric Kennedy, Class Action Attorney
Fees: The Key Role of the Federal District Judge in Fashioning & Monitoring Mass-Tort Common
Fund Distributions to Assure a Settlement Deemed Equitable by Both Represented &
Unrepresented Class Members, & Both Private & Class Counsel, 6 SEDONA CONF. J. 173 (2005)
and Michael Northrup, Restrictions on Class-Action Attorney-Fee Awards, 46 S. TEX. L. REV. 953
fund for others similarly situated, she did “for all practical purposes” make
a fund available to the others.  The Court ruled that the award of63
attorneys’ fees depends upon the individual circumstances in every case,
noting that “individualization in the exercise of a discretionary power will
alone retain equity as a living system and save it from sterility.”  The64
Court has recently affirmed the equitable power of federal courts to award
attorneys’ fees for the creation of a common fund.65
B.  Modern Application of the Common Fund Doctrine
Today, almost all states have adopted the common fund doctrine in
order to prevent the unjust enrichment of claimants who did not contribute
to the creation of the fund.  Although the common fund doctrine is66
routinely applied in cases involving subrogation and reimbursement,  its67
reach is much broader. The doctrine is frequently applied in class action
cases, cases where a litigant has created or preserved a trust, and cases
involving insurers’ subrogation or reimbursement claims.  The doctrine68
applies in all cases where an attorney has created the fund by performing
legal services and someone other than the attorney’s client benefits from
the fund without contributing to its creation.  In awarding fees and costs,69
courts have broad discretion and often award a fee based on the fee
arrangement between the attorney and her client.  Some states have70
11
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(2005).
71. See, e.g., Bishop v. Burgard, 764 N.E.2d 24, 28–29 (Ill. 2002) (applying the common
fund doctrine despite language obligating the plan participant to pay all attorneys’ fees and court
costs); Hamm v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 88 P.3d 395, 403 (Wash. 2004) (holding that “the
rule requiring a pro rata sharing of legal expenses is based on equitable principles and not on
construction of specific policy language[,]” thereby suggesting policy provisions are immaterial
(citing Winters v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 31 P.3d 1164, 1167 n.2 (Wash. 2001))).
72. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-79-146 (2008) (requiring insurers to pay a pro-rata share
of attorneys’ fees when recovering subrogation); GA. CODE ANN. § 33-24-56.1(b)(2) (2008)
(requiring insurers to pay a pro-rata share of attorneys’ fees when recovering subrogation or
reimbursement); IND. CODE § 34-51-2-19 (2008) (requiring insurers to pay a pro-rata share of
attorneys’ fees and expenses when recovering subrogation or reimbursement); IOWA CODE § 668.5
(2008) (requiring contractually subrogated persons to pay a pro-rata share of attorneys’ fees and
expenses); MINN. STAT. § 62A.095 (2008) (requiring insurers to pay a pro-rata share of attorneys’
fees and costs when recovering subrogation). 
73. ERISA, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§ 1001(a)–(c) (2006)) (citing the public policy of protecting the interests of plan participants and
beneficiaries); see also Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 845 (1997) (“The principal object of the
statute is to protect plan participants and beneficiaries.”); Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S.
85, 90 (1983) (“ERISA is a comprehensive statute designed to promote the interests of employees
and their beneficiaries in employee benefit plans.”); Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S.
504, 515 (1981) (noting that ERISA’s primary goal was to benefit employees and that a secondary
goal was to contain costs).
74. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a).
75. Id. § 1001(c).
explicitly held that an insurer cannot contract out of the common fund
doctrine,  while several others have enacted statutes requiring its71
application to insurers seeking subrogation or reimbursement.  72
IV.  ERISA PREEMPTION OF STATE-LAW CLAIMS FOR SUBROGATION OR
REIMBURSEMENT
To understand how ERISA impacts an ERISA-governed employee
benefit plan’s ability to obtain subrogation or reimbursement, one must
first consider the purposes of ERISA and closely examine its civil
enforcement and preemption provisions.
A.  ERISA 
1.  Purpose and Statutory Standards
Congress enacted ERISA in 1974 to protect the interests of employees
and their beneficiaries in employee benefit plans.  Congress explicitly73
stated that it was acting to “assur[e]”  and “improv[e] the equitable74
character . . . of such plans.”  To accomplish these goals, ERISA (1)75
established participation, vesting and funding standards; (2) imposed
various duties upon plan fiduciaries; (3) required greater reporting and
12
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76. See PAUL J. SCHNEIDER & BARBARA W. FREEDMAN, ERISA: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE
§§ 1.01, 1.04 (2d ed. 2003).
77. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (2006).
78. Id.
79. ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (2006).
80. ERISA § 502(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2) (2006).
81. ERISA § 502(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (2006). Section 502 authorizes additional
types of civil actions; none are as widely used as those authorized by subsection (a)(1)(B). See
SCHNEIDER & FREEDMAN, supra note 76, § 8.02.
82. ERISA § 502(e), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e) (2006).
83. Id.
84. See ERISA § 2(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (2006).
disclosure by plans; and (4) created a system of insurance to insure against
loss caused by plan termination.  Even though the legislation originally76
focused on pension plans, ERISA also regulates employee welfare benefit
plans that provide employees with “medical, surgical, or hospital care or
benefits, or benefits in the event of sickness, accident, disability, [or]
death.”  ERISA applies to self-insured plans as well as to plans that77
purchase insurance to secure benefits.78
2.  Civil Enforcement Scheme
To enforce the regulatory scheme established by ERISA, Congress
included § 502, which has several parts. Section 502(a)(1)(B) authorizes
plan participants and beneficiaries to sue to recover benefits.  Section79
502(a)(2) authorizes plan participants, beneficiaries, or fiduciaries to sue
fiduciaries for breach of a fiduciary duty.  Section 502(a)(3) authorizes a80
plan 
participant, beneficiary or fiduciary [to bring a civil action:]
(A) to enjoin any act or practice which violates any provision
of this subchapter or the terms of the plan, or (B) to obtain
other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress such violations
or (ii) to enforce any provisions of this subchapter or the
terms of the plan[.]81
Thus, the only claim that a plan fiduciary may bring under ERISA to
recover subrogation or reimbursement from a plan participant or
beneficiary is a claim pursuant to § 502(a)(3) for “appropriate equitable
relief” to redress an alleged violation of plan terms. 
Federal and state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over civil
actions to recover benefits under § 502(a)(1)(B).  Federal courts have82
exclusive jurisdiction over claims brought by participants, beneficiaries
or fiduciaries pursuant to § 503(a)(2) or (3).  Congress created federal83
question jurisdiction over these claims so that plan participants might have
“ready access to the Federal courts” to enforce their new statutory rights.84
13
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85. See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 46 (1987) (quoting Representative Dent
in the Congressional Record, 120 Cong. Rec. 29197 (1974)).
86. Id. (citing Senator Williams’ statement in the Congressional Record, 120 Cong. Rec.
29933 (1974)).
87. ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2006).
88. ERISA § 514(c)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(c)(1) (2006).
89. ERISA § 514(b)(2)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (2006). 
90.  When enacting the McCarran-Ferguson Act in 1945, “Congress . . . declare[d] that the
continued regulation and taxation by the several States of the business of insurance is in the public
interest . . . .” 15 U.S.C. § 1011 (2006); see also Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S.
724, 744 n.21 (1985) (“The ERISA saving clause . . . appears to have been designed to preserve the
McCarran-Ferguson Act’s reservation of [regulation of] the business of insurance to the States.”).
91. ERISA § 514(b)(2)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B) (2006).
92. See Metro. Life Ins., 471 U.S. at 747 (recognizing that its interpretation of the “deemer”
clause exempts self-funded plans from state insurance regulation to which insured plans are
subject).
93. 534 U.S. 204 (2002).
94. Id. at 220 (“We express no opinion as to whether [the plan fiduciary] could have
intervened in the state-court tort action brought by [the plan participants] or whether a direct action
by [the plan fiduciary] against [the plan participants] asserting state-law claims such as breach of
3.  Preemption Provisions
In addition to the comprehensive civil enforcement scheme, ERISA
also contains preemption provisions, described by sponsors of ERISA as
its “‘crowning achievement.’”  For the purpose of replacing conflicting85
state and local regulation of employee benefit plans with uniform federal
regulation,  § 514 expressly preempts and “supersede[s] any and all State86
laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit
plan.”  ERISA defines state law to include all state statutes, regulations,87
and common law.  However, any state law “which regulates insurance”88
is saved from preemption.  This savings clause is consistent with89
Congress’ belief that state, rather than federal, regulation of insurance is
in the public’s best interest.  To ensure that states do not inappropriately90
use insurance law to regulate employee benefit plans, Congress included
a provision in ERISA known as the deemer clause, which provides that an
employee benefit plan shall not be “deemed to be an insurance company
. . . or to be engaged in the business of insurance . . . for purposes of any
law of any State purporting to regulate insurance companies [or] insurance
contracts.”  Under existing precedent, the savings and deemer clauses91
have the effect of subjecting insured plans to state laws regulating
insurance even though self-funded plans are not subjected to such
regulation.92
B.  Preemption of State-Law Claims for Reimbursement or Subrogation
In Great-West Life & Annuity Insurance Co. v. Knudson,  the Supreme93
Court acknowledged as an issue, but failed to resolve, whether ERISA
preempts state-law claims for subrogation or reimbursement.  Lower94
14
Florida Law Review, Vol. 61, Iss. 1 [2009], Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol61/iss1/2
2009] APPLYING THE COMMON FUND DOCTRINE 69
contract would have been pre-empted by ERISA.”).
95. See Cmty. Ins. Co. v. Morgan, 54 F. App’x. 828, 832 (6th Cir. 2002) (finding express
preemption); Jefferson-Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Krafka, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 723, 725–26 (Cal. Ct. App.
1996) (finding express preemption and lack of jurisdiction over a claim exclusively within federal
court jurisdiction); MEBA Med. & Benefits Plan v. Lago, 867 So. 2d 1184, 1187–90 (Fla. 4th DCA
2004) (finding the health plan’s common-law claim for reimbursement preempted by ERISA);
Liberty Nw. Ins. Corp. v. Kemp, 85 P.3d 871, 877–79 (Or. Ct. App. 2004) (finding express
preemption and implied conflict preemption).
96.  See Funk Mfg. Co. v. Franklin, 927 P.2d 944, 949 (Kan. 1996) (finding that federal
courts have exclusive jurisdiction over claims to recover subrogation or reimbursement); A.
Copeland Enters., Inc. v. Slidell Mem’l Hosp., 657 So. 2d 1292, 1302 (La. 1995) (same).
97.  See Providence Health Plan v. McDowell, 385 F.3d 1168, 1172 (9th Cir. 2004); AFL
Hotel and Rest. Workers Health & Welfare Trust Fund v. Bosque, 132 P.3d 1229, 1236–37 (Haw.
2006).
98. See Yerby v. United Healthcare Ins. Co., 846 So. 2d 179, 182–83 (Miss. 2002) (holding
that the plan fiduciary could intervene in the plan participant’s tort law suit to recover
reimbursement); Reeds v. Walker, 157 P.3d 100, 109–12 (Okla. 2006) (finding that the state-law
claim for breach of contract was within the state court’s jurisdiction because it did not seek
equitable relief pursuant to § 502(a)(3)); Hamrick’s, Inc. v. Roy, 115 S.W.3d 468, 475–76 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 2003) (same).
99. See De Buono v. NYSA-ILA Med. & Clinical Servs. Fund, 520 U.S. 806, 808 n.1 (1997)
(observing that the Court had decided numerous cases involving the scope of the express
preemption clause and that the clause “has also generated an avalanche of litigation in the lower
courts”); Cal. Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., 519 U.S. 316, 335
(1997) (Scalia, J., concurring) (suggesting that the Court’s “prior decisions [addressing preemption]
have not succeeded in bringing clarity to the law”). As of 2004, there have been more than 8,000
reported state and federal court cases addressing preemption under § 514(a). Liberty Nw. Ins., 85
P.3d at 873.
100. Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 98 (1983).
courts have split on the issue. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit and state courts in California, Florida, and Oregon have found
state-law claims for reimbursement or subrogation preempted.  Similarly,95
state courts in Kansas and Louisiana have dismissed state-law claims for
reimbursement or subrogation for lack of jurisdiction.  The U.S. Court of96
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court of Hawaii, however,
have found that such claims are not preempted.  In addition, state courts97
in Mississippi, Oklahoma, and Tennessee have found jurisdiction over
such claims without specifically addressing preemption.  This Article98
argues that state-law claims for subrogation and reimbursement are
expressly, impliedly, and completely preempted by ERISA.
1.  Express Preemption
Parties continue to litigate the scope of the express preemption under
§ 514(a) despite the Court’s repeated attempts to clarify the issue.  In an99
early preemption case, the Court, noting that an early draft of the ERISA
bill contained a much more limited preemption clause, held that “Congress
used the words ‘relate to’ . . . in their broad sense.”  The Court concluded100
that “[a] law ‘relates to’ an employee benefit plan, in the normal sense of
15
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101. Id. at 96–97; see also Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 739 (1985).
102. Shaw, 463 U.S. at 97.
103. Id.
104. Metro. Life Ins., 471 U.S. at 739.
105. Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 829–30 (1988).
106. FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 58 (1990).
107. 481 U.S. 41 (1987).
108. Id. at 48.
109. Id. at 47. 
110. 481 U.S. 58 (1987).
111. Id. at 62 (quoting ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2006)). As discussed in more
detail at infra notes 137–43 and accompanying text, the Court further found that the state-law
claims were completely preempted. 
112. 498 U.S. 133 (1990).
113. Id. at 135–36.
the phrase, if it has a connection with or reference to such a plan.”  Under101
this rubric, the Court found that the following laws were related to an
employee benefit plan: a New York law prohibiting employers from
implementing plans that discriminate on the basis of pregnancy;  a New102
York law requiring employers to pay certain benefits;  a Massachusetts103
law requiring minimum mental health benefits;  a Georgia statute104
explicitly barring the garnishment of funds or benefits belonging to an
ERISA employee benefit plan or program;  and a Pennsylvania105
anti-subrogation statute.  106
In a series of cases addressing preemption of state-law claims, the
Court repeatedly found that state-law claims based on plan provisions were
preempted. In Pilot Life Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux,  the Court found that107
ERISA preempted Mississippi common law authorizing claims for bad
faith and tortious breach of contract for failure to pay benefits owed under
the insurance policy.  Without analysis, the Court held that the common-108
law claims undisputedly related to an employee benefit plan and were
therefore expressly preempted.  In Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v.109
Taylor,  the Court summarily found that ERISA expressly preempted110
Michigan common law authorizing contract claims for failure to pay
benefits and tort claims for mental anguish caused by the failure to pay.111
In Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon,  an employee brought a112
wrongful-termination claim against his employer based on Texas state tort
and contract law, alleging that his employer terminated him just prior to
his benefits vesting to avoid paying pension fund contributions.  The113
Court concluded that the state-law claim clearly related to an employee
benefit plan and was therefore expressly preempted by § 514(a) of ERISA:
We are not dealing here with a generally applicable statute
that makes no reference to, or indeed functions irrespective
of, the existence of an ERISA plan . . . . Here, the existence
of a . . . plan is a critical factor in establishing liability under
the State’s wrongful discharge law. As a result, this cause of
16
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114. Id. at 139–40.
115. 514 U.S. 645 (1995).
116. See id. at 656–57.
117. Id. (“For the same reasons that infinite relations cannot be the measure of pre-emption,
neither can infinite connections.”).  See also Thomas R. McLean & Edward P. Richards, Managed
Care Liability for Breach of Fiduciary Duty After Pegram v. Herdrich: The End of ERISA
Preemption for State Law Liability for Medical Care Decision Making, 53 FLA. L. REV. 1, 8–20
(2001).
118. Id. at 659–60.
119. De Buono v. NYSA-ILA Med. & Clinical Servs. Fund, 520 U.S. 806, 815 & n.14 (1997).
120. See Cmty. Ins. Co. v. Morgan, 54 F. App’x. 828, 832 (6th Cir. 2002) (“[W]e think it is
clear that the dispute cannot be resolved without resort to the terms of the ERISA plan, and that
being so, [the plan fiduciary’s] state law claim [for subrogation and reimbursement] has a
connection with that plan.”); Liberty Nw. Ins. Corp. v. Kemp, 85 P.3d 871, 877 (Or. Ct. App. 2004)
(“[The] complaint [for reimbursement] derives from and is based on an employee benefit
plan . . . . To prevail, plaintiff had to prove the existence of the employer benefit plan and a
violation of one of its terms . . . . The claim therefore ‘has reference to’ ERISA.”).
action relates not merely to [plan] benefits, but to the essence
of the . . . plan itself.  114
In each of these cases, the preempted state-law claims required
interpretation of—and were contingent upon—the plan.
In 1995, the Court, in New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue
Shield Plans v. Travelers Insurance Co.,  retreated from its jurisprudence115
broadly interpreting the express preemption clause.  Although the Court116
affirmed that a state law relates to an employee benefit plan when it
references or has a connection with such a plan, the Court held that to
determine whether a state law has a prohibited connection with an
employee benefit plan, the Court must look to the objectives of ERISA,
one of which is to foster nationally uniform administration of benefit
plans.  In deciding that the New York law at issue, which required117
hospitals to impose surcharges on certain HMOs and patients, was not
preempted, the Court emphasized that although the law would have an
“indirect economic influence” given that the surcharges would likely cause
an increase in the cost of insurance, it would not “preclude uniform
administrative practice or the provision of a uniform interstate benefit
package.”  118
Even under its restrictive post-Travelers approach to express
preemption, the Court made clear that state-law causes of action are
preempted if “the existence of a[n] [employee benefit] plan is a critical
element of a state-law cause of action[.]”  Clearly, the subrogation or119
reimbursement provisions of a plan are critical to any state-law claim for
subrogation or reimbursement.  Therefore, state-law claims for120
subrogation or reimbursement are expressly preempted by ERISA.
The Ninth Circuit’s holding to the contrary in Providence Health Plan
rests on faulty reasoning. The court held that the plan’s claim for
17
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121. Providence Health Plan v. McDowell, 385 F.3d 1168, 1172 (9th Cir. 2004).
122. Id.
123. Although the Supreme Court has suggested that “run-of-the-mill state-law claims” do not
relate to plans simply because they may be brought by or against plans, see Mackey v. Lanier
Collection Agency & Serv., Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 833 (1988), claims for reimbursement or
subrogation are more than “run-of-the-mill state-law claims” because they are claims that are
necessarily based upon the provisions of the plan. Thus, such claims are easily distinguishable from
the state-law claim for garnishment that the Court found was not preempted in Mackey because the
garnishment claim at issue there was in no way based upon the terms of the plan. See id. at 831; see
also Liberty Nw. Ins., 85 P.3d at 876–77 (similarly arguing that state-law claims for reimbursement
and subrogation are not generic run-of-the mill state-law claims). 
124. Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 64 (2002). State law is impliedly preempted
when the scope of the federal legislation indicates that Congress intended to exclusively occupy
the entire field of legislation (field preemption), or when it is impossible for a party to comply with
both state and federal law or the state law “‘stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress’” (conflict preemption). Id. at 64–65
(quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)); see also Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 841
(1997) (noting that express preemption, implied field preemption, and implied conflict preemption
are alternative grounds upon which to find ERISA preemption). Ordinary implied preemption
principles apply despite the presence of the express preemption clause. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S.
at 65.
125. 498 U.S. 133 (1990).
reimbursement did not have the necessary “connection with” or “reference
to” the employee benefit plan because the plan was merely attempting to
enforce the reimbursement provision through contract law.  Amazingly,121
the court concluded that “[a]djudication of [a claim for reimbursement]
does not require interpreting the plan . . . .”  Contrary to the court’s122
holding, however, claims for reimbursement and subrogation are based on
plan provisions and do require interpretation of such plan provisions.123
Consequently, state-law claims for subrogation or reimbursement are
expressly preempted by § 514(a) of ERISA. This reasoning means that
state-law claims for subrogation or reimbursement are preempted
regardless of whether the plan fiduciary initiates a direct civil action
against the plan participant or third-party tortfeasor, or moves to intervene
in the plan participant’s tort case. Given that the plan fiduciary’s ability to
intervene on behalf of the plan is based on plan subrogation and
reimbursement provisions, such intervention “relates to” an employee
benefit plan in exactly the same way a direct claim for reimbursement or
subrogation does. 
2.  Implied Preemption
Even if not expressly preempted by § 514(a), state-law claims may be
preempted according to ordinary principles of implied conflict
preemption.  In Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon,  the Court found that124 125
Texas common law authorizing a claim for wrongful termination,
allegedly motivated by the employer’s desire to avoid contributing to the
18
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126. Id. at 142–44; see supra notes 112–14 and accompanying text (discussing the Court’s
alternative finding of express preemption in Ingersoll-Rand).
127. 481 U.S. 41 (1987).
128. Ingersoll-Rand, 498 U.S. at 144 (omission in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 54).
129. Id. (alterations in original) (quoting English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 87 (1990)).
130. Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 379 (2002).
131. 542 U.S. 200 (2004).
132. Id. at 209.
terminated employee’s pension fund, was impliedly preempted because it
conflicted with the exclusive enforcement mechanism provided by
§ 502(a)(3) to enjoin acts that violate ERISA provisions, including § 510,
which prohibits termination of plan participants for the purpose of
avoiding vesting of benefits.  In so finding, the Court relied heavily upon126
its conclusion in Pilot Life Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux  that Congress127
intended § 502(a) to be the exclusive remedy to enforce ERISA rights:
[T]he detailed provisions of § 502(a) set forth a
comprehensive civil enforcement scheme that represents a
careful balancing of the need for prompt and fair claims
settlement procedures against the public interest in
encouraging the formation of employee benefit plans. The
policy choices reflected in the inclusion of certain remedies
and the exclusion of others under the federal scheme would
be completely undermined if ERISA-plan participants and
beneficiaries were free to obtain remedies under state law that
Congress rejected in ERISA. The six carefully integrated civil
enforcement provisions found in § 502(a) of the statute as
finally enacted . . . provide strong evidence that Congress did
not intend to authorize other remedies that it simply forgot to
incorporate expressly.  128
The Court further held that § 502(a)’s exclusive remedy “is precisely the
kind of ‘special featur[e]’ that ‘warrant[s] pre-emption.’”  In a later129
description of its Ingersoll-Rand opinion, the Court noted that the state-
law claim for money damages “provided a form of ultimate relief in a
judicial forum that added to the judicial remedies provided by ERISA” and
was therefore incompatible with the equitable claim available under
ERISA.  130
More recently, in Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila,  the Court held that131
“any state-law cause of action that duplicates, supplements, or supplants
the ERISA civil enforcement remedy conflicts with the clear congressional
intent to make the ERISA remedy exclusive and is therefore pre-
empted.”  Under the Court’s holding, a state-law claim is preempted when132
it provides a type of relief unavailable under ERISA even if the elements of
19
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133. Id. at 215–16 (holding that state-law claims are preempted if they attempt “to convert an
equitable remedy [available under ERISA] into a legal remedy [available in state court]”).
134. ERISA § 502(a)(3)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3)(B) (2006).
135. See Liberty Nw. Ins. Corp. v. Kemp, 85 P.3d 871, 878–79 (Or. Ct. App. 2004) (finding
implied conflict preemption because a state law claim for reimbursement is “a preempted
alternative enforcement mechanism”).
136. Prior to Sereboff, it was argued that state-law claims for subrogation and reimbursement
were necessary to avoid the regulatory vacuum caused by plans’ inability to successfully assert
reimbursement or subrogation claims pursuant to § 502(a)(3). See, e.g., Brian A. Perez-Daple,
Comment, Legal Reimbursement Claims by ERISA Plan Fiduciaries, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 1103,
1123–24 (2005) (arguing that ERISA preemption of state-law claims creates a regulatory vacuum
because recovering subrogation or reimbursement is too difficult under ERISA). Such arguments
are arguably much weaker given the Court’s opinion in Sereboff authorizing plans to seek
reimbursement by asserting equitable liens by agreement under § 502(a)(3). Sereboff v. Mid Atl.
Med. Servs., Inc., 547 U.S. 356, 364–65 (2006). Moreover, if a plan seeks reimbursement by
asserting a constructive trust, another type of equitable relief within the scope of § 502(a)(3), it may
avoid some of the earlier problems faced by plans in cases where the defendant no longer had
possession of the identifiable funds by simply bringing the § 502(a)(3) claim against the person
who is in possession of the funds. See, e.g., Admin. Comm. for the Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. Assocs.
Health & Welfare Plan v. Horton, 513 F.3d 1223, 1227, 1229 (11th Cir. 2008) (allowing a plan to
bring a § 502(a)(3) claim asserting a constructive trust against the plan beneficiary’s conservator
who had possession of the funds).  
the state-law claim are not exact duplicates of the ERISA claim.133
Given that § 502(a)(3) of ERISA authorizes a plan fiduciary to bring
a civil cause of action “to obtain other appropriate equitable relief . . . to
redress . . . violations [of plan terms],”  any state-law claim for134
reimbursement or subrogation necessarily conflicts with the exclusive
equitable remedy provided by § 502(a)(3) and is therefore impliedly
preempted.  State-law claims for reimbursement or subrogation are legal135
claims for money damages and therefore provide a prohibited type of
alternative relief unavailable under ERISA. Arguments that state-law
claims for reimbursement and subrogation should be permitted disregard
the fact that Congress carefully weighed the types of relief that should be
available to plan fiduciaries to enforce plan terms—and limited such relief
to § 502(a)(3) claims for “appropriate equitable relief” within the
exclusive jurisdiction of federal courts.  Arguments against preemption136
also overlook the inequity that would result if courts were to continue to
interpret ERISA to broadly preempt state-law claims brought by plan
participants and beneficiaries while interpreting ERISA to narrowly
preempt state-law claims brought by plan fiduciaries. 
3.  Complete Preemption
Not only are state-law claims for reimbursement or subrogation
expressly and impliedly preempted, but they are also completely
preempted, giving rise to federal question removal jurisdiction. Typically,
preemption by a federal statute is an affirmative defense that does not give
20
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137. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63–64 (1987).
138. 481 U.S. 58 (1987).
139. Id. at 64–66.
140. Id. at 67.
141. Id.
142. Beneficial Nat’l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 7–8 (2003) (describing the Court’s
holding in Taylor).
143. See Taylor, 481 U.S. at 66.
144. 536 U.S. 355 (2002). 
145. Id. at 363–64.
146. Id. at 361–62.
rise to removal jurisdiction because the complaint filed in state court does
not raise a federal question on the face of the well-pleaded complaint.
However, the Court has recognized an exception to the well-pleaded
complaint rule in cases where Congress clearly intended to “so completely
pre-empt a particular area that any civil complaint raising this select group
of claims is necessarily federal in character.”137
In Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Taylor,  the Court extended the138
complete preemption doctrine—which had previously been limited to
claims falling within § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act—to
claims for employee benefits that fall within the scope of § 502(a).  The139
Court found that the plaintiff’s complaint, which asserted both a breach of
contract claim seeking money owed under the benefit plan and a tort claim
for mental anguish caused by the failure to pay, “[was] necessarily federal
in character by virtue of the clearly manifested intent of Congress[,]”140
and that therefore, the suit arose under federal law.  The Court reasoned141
that because § 502 provides exclusive causes of action and sets forth
procedures and remedies governing those exclusive causes of action, § 502
completely preempts any state-law claim that comes within the scope of
§ 502.  The Court found the plaintiff’s state-law complaint within the142
scope of § 502 and therefore completely preempted even though § 502
does not authorize any tort claims for mental anguish arising from a
wrongful failure to pay benefits.  143
Similarly, in Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran,  the Court found144
that a plan participant’s amended state-court complaint seeking
reimbursement for medically necessary surgery was completely
preempted.  Interestingly, however, the Court suggested that ERISA also145
completely preempted the plan participant’s original state-court complaint
seeking to compel an independent medical review required by an Illinois
statute.  The Court questioned the district court’s remand of the original146
complaint, implying that removal was appropriate based on complete
preemption because a suit to compel an independent review could either
be brought under § 503(a)(3) as a suit to force compliance with an ERISA
21
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147. Id. at 362 n.2.
148. 542 U.S. 200 (2004).
149. Id. at 204.
150. Id. at 208 (quoting Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 147 (1985)).
151. Id. at 209.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 210.
154. Id. at 214 (“[D]istinguishing between pre-empted and non-pre-empted claims based on
the particular label affixed to them would ‘elevate form over substance and allow parties to evade’
the pre-emptive scope of ERISA simply ‘by relabeling their contract claims as claims for tortious
breach of contract.’” (quoting Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 211 (1985))). 
155. Id. at 215 (“The limited remedies available under ERISA are an inherent part of the
‘careful balancing’ between ensuring fair and prompt enforcement of rights under a plan and the
encouragement of the creation of such plans.” (citing Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41,
54 (1987))).
156. Id. at 215–16.
plan or as a § 502(a)(1)(B) claim for benefits or to enforce rights under the
plan.147
In Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila,  the Court addressed two consolidated148
cases in which individuals had sued their HMOs in state court alleging that
the HMOs had violated a Texas statute by failing to exercise ordinary care
when making coverage decisions.  In finding that the cases were properly149
removed based upon complete preemption, the Court again observed that
ERISA was a “‘comprehensive legislative scheme’” with an “integrated
enforcement mechanism” reflecting careful public policy choices to
include certain remedies while excluding others.  The Court held that150
“any state-law cause of action that duplicates, supplements, or supplants
the ERISA civil enforcement remedy conflicts with the clear congressional
intent to make the ERISA remedy exclusive and is therefore pre-
empted.”151
The Court further held that the preemptive force of the civil
enforcement provision was so strong that any state-law complaint alleging
a cause of action within the scope of § 502 was completely preempted and
removable to federal court.  The Court concluded that the individuals’152
claims that their HMOs wrongfully denied coverage were completely
preempted because the claims could have been brought pursuant to
§ 502(a) and were based solely on legal obligations to provide coverage
arising from the plan provisions.  The Court found it irrelevant that the153
plaintiffs brought state-law claims for failure to use ordinary care rather
than contract claims for benefits owed,  that the state-law claims might154
afford the plaintiffs a remedy greater than the remedy authorized by
ERISA,  and that the elements of the state-law claim did not precisely155
duplicate those of an ERISA claim.  Thus, just as state-law claims for156
subrogation or reimbursement are impliedly preempted because the state
claims provide an additional judicial remedy not available under ERISA,
22
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157. The state common law authorizing breach of contract claims for reimbursement or
subrogation is not saved from preemption as law regulating insurance because such general contract
law is not “specifically directed toward entities engaged in insurance” as required by Kentucky
Ass’n of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller, 538 U.S. 329, 341–42 (2003).
158. State laws that are not preempted by ERISA apply to claims brought pursuant to § 502(a).
See UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Ward, 526 U.S. 358, 376–77 (1999) (applying California’s
notice-prejudice rule to a plan participant’s § 502(a)(1)(B) claim to recover benefits). There is an
alternative to a lawyer’s assertion of a state law claim against the plan for fees pursuant to the
common fund doctrine. See, e.g., Alleman v. Bluecross Blueshield of Ill., 231 F. Supp. 2d 822, 827
(S.D. Ill. 2002) (finding that a lawyer’s state-law claim for fees pursuant to the common fund
doctrine was not completely preempted by ERISA because it was not within the scope of claims
authorized by § 502). A fair share of the fees and expenses can be deducted from any
reimbursement or subrogation awarded to a plan by simply applying the state common fund
doctrine to a plan’s § 502(a)(3) claim for “appropriate equitable relief.”
159. See, e.g., Eberspacher v. Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co., No. 4:04-CV-3304, 2005 WL 1377865,
at *6–7 (D. Neb. June 8, 2005) (finding Nebraska’s common fund doctrine expressly preempted);
IBEW-NECA Sw. Health & Benefit Fund v. Gurule, 337 F. Supp. 2d 845, 857–58 (N.D. Tex.
2004) (finding New Mexico’s common fund doctrine expressly preempted).
160. See, e.g., Primax Recoveries, Inc. v. Sevilla, 324 F.3d 544, 548–49 (7th Cir. 2003)
(finding that the state common fund doctrine is not preempted); Blackburn v. Sundstrand Corp., 115
F.3d 493, 495–96 (7th Cir. 1997) (same); Bishop v. Burgard, 764 N.E.2d 24, 29–33 (Ill. 2002)
(same); Scholtens v. Schneider, 671 N.E.2d 657, 662–67 (Ill. 1996) (same); see also Florin v.
Nationsbank of Ga., 34 F.3d 560, 564 (7th Cir. 1994) (awarding attorneys’ fees in an ERISA class
action case pursuant to the common fund doctrine after finding that ERISA did not preempt the
common fund doctrine).
161. See, e.g., Admin. Comm. of the Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. Assocs.’ Health & Welfare Fund
v. Hummell, 245 F. Supp. 2d 908, 912 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (concluding that “state law cannot void
explicit . . . provisions in ERISA plans”); Yerby v. United Healthcare Ins. Co., 846 So. 2d 179,
they are also completely preempted because they fall within the scope of
§ 502(a)(3), which authorizes claims for appropriate equitable relief to
redress violations of plan terms.157
V.  APPLICATION OF STATE COMMON FUND DOCTRINES OR STATUTES
TO § 502(A)(3) CLAIMS FOR “APPROPRIATE EQUITABLE RELIEF”
Given that state-law claims for subrogation and reimbursement are
preempted, it is necessary to determine whether state common fund
doctrines or state statutes codifying the doctrine are also preempted. If not,
they apply to a plan’s § 502(a)(3) claim for recoupment.  158
A.  State Common-Law Common Fund Doctrines Are Not Preempted
Courts have not uniformly resolved whether state common fund
doctrines are expressly preempted by ERISA; some courts have found
express preemption,  while others have not.  Many courts have simply159 160
concluded, without even performing a preemption analysis, that plan
language can invalidate otherwise applicable state law establishing the
common fund doctrine.  161
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190–91 (Miss. 2002) (finding that the common fund doctrine does not apply to an ERISA plan’s
claim for reimbursement without deciding whether ERISA preempted the state common fund
doctrine); Palmerton v. Assocs. Health & Welfare Plan, 659 N.W.2d 183, 188 (Wis. Ct. App. 2003)
(holding that ERISA plans can disclaim otherwise applicable law mandating application of the
common fund doctrine). Many federal appellate court opinions address whether federal common
law permits or requires application of the federal common fund doctrine to a plan’s claim for
subrogation or reimbursement. See, e.g., Bombardier Aerospace Employee Welfare Benefits Plan
v. Ferrer, Poirot and Wansbrough, 354 F.3d 348, 360–61 (5th Cir. 2003); Harris v. Harvard Pilgrim
Health Care, Inc., 208 F.3d 274, 279 (1st Cir. 2000); United McGill Corp. v. Stinnett, 154 F.3d 168,
173 (4th Cir. 1998); Bollman Hat Co. v. Root, 112 F.3d 113, 116 (3d Cir. 1997). However, very
few cases address whether ERISA preempts applicable state common fund doctrines. 
162. See Blackburn, 115 F.3d at 495 (“Most applications [of the common fund doctrine] have
nothing to do with health insurance in general, or employer-sponsored plans in particular.”);
Scholtens, 671 N.E.2d at 663 (“The common fund doctrine is a common law rule of general
application.”).
163. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
164. 514 U.S. 645 (1995).
165. Id. at 656, 658–59. 
166. 519 U.S. 316 (1997).
167. Id. at 328–41.
1.  Express Preemption
Common fund doctrines established by state common law do not refer
to ERISA; instead they are state laws of general application.  States apply162
the common fund doctrine not only in cases in which an insurer is seeking
subrogation or reimbursement, but also in class action cases and cases
where a litigant has created or preserved trust assets.  Under the more163
narrow interpretation of the express preemption clause announced by the
Court in New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v.
Travelers Insurance Co.,  when the state law at issue does not directly164
reference ERISA, the state law may nevertheless be preempted if it has a
forbidden connection with ERISA plans, which is to be determined by
examining “the objectives of the ERISA statute” and the effect of the state
law on ERISA plans.  Using this approach, the Court has repeatedly165
found that state laws of general application are not preempted if they do
not substantially obstruct nationally uniform plan administration and do
not address an area of core ERISA concern. 
For example, in California Division of Labor Standards Enforcement
v. Dillingham Construction,  the Court held that ERISA did not preempt166
California’s prevailing wage statute after concluding that: (1) the statute
governed areas that were traditionally within state regulation rather than
areas of core ERISA concern; (2) there was no legislative or other history
indicating that ERISA was intended to preempt laws of this type; and
(3) the state statute did not bind plans to any particular outcome.  The167
Court held that the law at issue was “‘no different from myriad state laws
in areas traditionally subject to local regulation, which Congress could not
24
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168. Id. at 334 (quoting Travelers, 514 U.S. at 668).
169. 520 U.S. 806 (1997).
170. Id. at 814–15.
171. Id. at 816.
172. 520 U.S. 833 (1997).
173. Id. at 835–37.
174. Id. at 836–37.
175. Id. at 841–44.
176. 532 U.S. 141 (2001).
177. Id. at 144.
178. Id. at 147–48.
possibly have intended to eliminate.’”  In De Buono v. NYSA-ILA168
Medical & Clinical Services Fund,  the Court found that ERISA did not169
preempt New York’s tax on hospital gross receipts because the tax was in
an area of traditional state regulation and there was no evidence that
Congress intended to supersede New York’s tax law.  The Court170
emphasized that preemption is not required simply because a state law
increases the costs of provided benefits or has some effect on plan
administration.171
Conversely, a state law that regulates an area of core ERISA concern,
directly conflicts with an ERISA provision, or significantly interferes with
nationally uniform plan administration has a forbidden connection with
ERISA and is therefore expressly preempted. For example, in Boggs v.
Boggs,  the Court determined whether Louisiana community property172
law or ERISA controlled the distribution of pension plan benefits in a case
in which the plan participant remarried after his first wife died.173
Louisiana’s community property law would recognize the deceased
spouse’s bequest of her community property interest in her ex-husband’s
undistributed pension plan benefits to her sons, while ERISA would
require that the pension plan benefits be paid as an annuity solely to her
husband  as the surviving spouse. The Court found that Louisiana’s174
community property law was preempted because it directly conflicted with
an ERISA provision requiring that annuities be paid to the surviving
spouse.175
In Egelhoff v. Egelhoff,  the Court considered a Washington statute176
mandating automatic revocation of the designation of a spouse as
beneficiary in the event of divorce.  The Court found that ERISA177
preempted the state law because the law “implicate[d] an area of core
ERISA concern”—beneficiary designations and payment of benefits. The
law also conflicted with an ERISA provision requiring payment of benefits
to a beneficiary designated by the plan participant, and “interfere[d] with
nationally uniform plan administration.”  178
Applying the common fund doctrine to an ERISA plan’s claim for
subrogation or reimbursement does not implicate a core ERISA concern.
25
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179. See Scholtens v. Schneider, 671 N.E.2d 657, 662 (Ill. 1996). A recent attempt to amend
ERISA so as to explicitly permit all claims for subrogation and reimbursement pursuant to
§ 502(a)(3) failed. Pension Protection Act of 2005, H.R. 2830, 109th Cong. § 307 (2005).
180. See Scholtens, 671 N.E.2d at 667.
181. Id. 
182. See Blackburn v. Sundstrand Corp., 115 F.3d 493, 495 (7th Cir. 1997) (“The common-
fund doctrine long predates not only ERISA but also employer-sponsored health plans.”).
183. 498 U.S. 52 (1990).
184. 451 U.S. 504 (1981); see, e.g., Eberspacher v. Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co., No. 4:04-CV-
3304, 2005 WL 1377865, at *6 (D. Neb. June 8, 2005); IBEW-NECA Sw. Health & Benefit Fund
v. Gurule, 337 F. Supp. 2d 845, 857 (N.D. Tex. 2004). 
185. Holliday, 498 U.S. at 59 (first two alterations in original) (quoting 75 PA. CONS. STAT.
§ 1720 (1987)).
186. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1720 (2008).
187. Holliday, 498 U.S. at 60.
ERISA does not address subrogation or reimbursement; it neither requires
nor prohibits such claims.  Moreover, application of the common fund179
doctrine does not bind the plan to a particular choice; plans may choose to
hire their own attorney to pursue subrogation against the tortfeasor or they
may rely on the plan participant’s lawyer to do so.  If the plan chooses180
to rely on the participant’s lawyer, however, it must pay its fair share of
the attorneys’ fees and costs.  States were applying the common fund181
doctrine well before ERISA, and there is nothing in ERISA’s legislative
history to suggest Congress intended to preempt the common fund
doctrine.  182
Courts that have found the common fund doctrine expressly preempted
have done so because they likened the doctrine to state anti-subrogation
statutes, such as the one found expressly preempted in FMC Corp. v.
Holliday, or the statute prohibiting a method of calculating pension plan183
benefits found expressly preempted in Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan,
Inc.184
In Holliday, the Court found that Pennsylvania’s anti-subrogation
statute explicitly referenced ERISA plans because it provided that “‘[i]n
actions arising out of the maintenance or use of a motor vehicle, there shall
be no right of subrogation or reimbursement from a claimant’s tort
recovery with respect to . . . benefits . . . payable under section 1719.’”185
Section 1719 of Pennsylvania’s statutes, in turn, governed coordination of
benefits payable by “a program, group contract or other arrangement.”186
In addition, the Court determined that the statute also had a “connection”
to ERISA plans because it required plan providers to calculate benefit
levels differently in Pennsylvania and consequently frustrated
administrators’ ability “to calculate uniform benefit levels nationwide.”187
State common fund doctrines are significantly different from the anti-
subrogation statute at issue in Holliday, which was aimed directly at group
health care plans. The common fund doctrine applies to a much broader
26
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188. Blackburn v. Sundstrand Corp., 115 F.3d 493, 495–96 (7th Cir.1997).
189. Scholtens v. Schneider, 671 N.E.2d 657, 663 (Ill. 1996). The concern that application of
state laws might place a substantial financial burden on plan administrators because they would be
forced to master varied laws throughout the states (see for example, Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S.
141, 149–50 (2001)), is a much more significant concern in the context of state laws prohibiting
and limiting subrogation and reimbursement because there is much more variance among the states
in that area when compared to the general uniformity with which states apply the common fund
doctrine.
190. Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 521–24 (1981). 
191. 486 U.S. 825, 828 (1988).
192. Id. at 832–33.
193. Id. at 834 n.8.
194. Scholtens, 671 N.E.2d at 665.
range of cases and “is indifferent . . . to the basis of any particular claim
to the fund.”  In addition, application of the common fund doctrine188
would not obstruct nationally uniform plan administration to the same
extent as application of myriad state anti-subrogation statutes because the
common fund doctrine has been recognized in substantially the same form
by a large majority of states.  189
In Alessi, the Court found that ERISA expressly preempted a New
Jersey statute prohibiting a reduction in retirement benefits based on the
employee’s eligibility for workers’ compensation benefits. The Court
found the statute “eliminate[d] one method for calculating pension
benefits.”  Obviously, the statute concerning calculation of benefits in190
Alessi regulates a matter of core ERISA concern; the common fund
doctrine does not.
The doctrine is more akin to Georgia’s general garnishment statute at
issue in Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Service, Inc.  Even191
though Georgia’s garnishment statute would substantially increase the
plan’s administrative burdens and costs, the Court nevertheless found that
the statute was not preempted, observing that ERISA plans are subject to
“run-of-the-mill” state laws, including state laws that might give rise to
contract or tort claims against the plan.  The Court referenced a case in192
which an ERISA plan was required, pursuant to state contract law, to pay
an attorney.  Clearly, ERISA does not preempt state contract law193
governing the payment of attorneys’ fees. Nor should it preempt state law
requiring payment of attorneys’ fees pursuant to “equitable considerations
of quantum meruit and the prevention of unjust enrichment.”  The194
common fund doctrine is a rule of general application that predates
ERISA, governs an area traditionally within state regulation rather than a
core ERISA concern, does not bind the plan to a particular outcome, and
does not substantially interfere with nationally uniform administration.
Therefore, the common fund doctrine does not have a forbidden
connection with ERISA and is not expressly preempted. 
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195. See Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 841 (1997) (observing that ERISA impliedly preempts
state laws that “conflict[] with . . . ERISA or operate[] to frustrate its objects”).
196. For a more detailed discussion, see infra notes 284–302 and accompanying text, arguing
that application of the common fund doctrine serves the purposes of ERISA.
197. See Admin. Comm. of the Wal-Mart Stores Inc. Assocs. Health & Welfare Plan v. Varco,
338 F.3d 680, 690 (7th Cir. 2003).
198. Id.
199. For examples of state statutes codifying the common fund doctrine as part of a statutory
scheme that limits subrogation or reimbursement, see supra note 72.
2.  Implied Preemption
The common fund doctrine is also not impliedly preempted by ERISA
because it is possible for a plan to satisfy the requirements of ERISA and
also satisfy the requirements of a state common fund doctrine.  Given195
that ERISA is silent on the issue of reimbursement and subrogation claims
and is also silent on the application of the common fund doctrine to such
claims, it cannot be said that the common fund doctrine conflicts with an
ERISA provision. Moreover, application of the common fund doctrine
operates to further, rather than obstruct, ERISA’s goal of protecting the
interests of plan participants and their beneficiaries.  Although the U.S.196
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit found that ERISA impliedly
preempted a state’s common fund doctrine, the court used faulty
reasoning.  Essentially, the court found that the common fund doctrine197
was impliedly preempted because it conflicted with the plan provisions
disclaiming the doctrine.  Conflict, or implied, preemption, however,198
cannot be based solely upon a conflict between a plan provision and state
law. Otherwise, a plan could avoid application of state law simply by
including a plan provision to the contrary. Certainly, Congress did not
intend to give plans unilateral ability to avoid state law by including
inconsistent plan provisions. Thus, common fund doctrines found in state
common law are not expressly or impliedly preempted by ERISA and may
apply to a plan’s § 502(2)(3) claim for reimbursement.
B.  Many State Statutes Codifying the Common Fund Doctrine Are
Saved From Preemption 
1.  The Savings Clause
Unlike common fund doctrines established by state common law,
several state statutes requiring an insurer to pay a portion of attorneys’ fees
when recovering subrogation or reimbursement may fall within ERISA’s
express preemption clause. Many such statutes explicitly refer to group
health insurance plans or are integral to a statutory scheme that limits an
insurer’s ability to recover subrogation or reimbursement.  Such laws,199
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200. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 744 n.21 (1985). The McCarran-
Ferguson Act declared that state, rather than federal, regulation of the business of insurance is in
the public interest and that no federal statute “shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede
any [state] law . . . regulating the business of insurance.” 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011–1012(b) (2006).
201. See Metro. Life Ins., 471 U.S. at 739–40 (“The two pre-emption sections, while clear
enough on their faces, perhaps are not a model of legislative drafting, for while the general pre-
emption clause broadly pre-empts state law, the saving clause appears broadly to preserve the
States’ lawmaking power over much of the same regulation. While Congress occasionally decides
to return to the States what it has previously taken away, it does not normally do both at the same
time.”).
202. See, e.g., Singh v. Prudential Health Care Plan, Inc., 335 F.3d 278, 284–86 (4th Cir.
2003) (holding that a subrogation prohibition in Maryland’s HMO Act was a law regulating
insurance); Med. Mut. of Ohio v. DeSoto, 245 F.3d 561, 573–74 (6th Cir. 2001) (finding that
California’s statute altering the traditional collateral source rule and prohibiting subrogation and
reimbursement is a law regulating insurance); Smith v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 466 F. Supp. 2d
1275, 1291 (N.D. Ga. 2006) (holding that Georgia’s anti-subrogation statute, which includes an
attorneys’ fees provision, is a law regulating insurance); Admin. Comm. of the Wal-Mart Assocs.
Health & Welfare Plan v. Willard, 302 F. Supp. 2d 1267, 1282 (D. Kan. 2004) (finding that a
Kansas anti-subrogation regulation is a law regulating insurance).
203. 402 F.3d 156 (3d Cir. 2005).
204. Id. at 165–67.
205. 538 U.S. 329 (2003).
206. Id. at 341–42.
207. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 48–51 (1987). 
however, regulate insurance and are therefore saved from preemption.
ERISA’s savings clause exempts state laws regulating insurance from
preemption, as Congress decided that states are best suited to regulate
insurance.  Although the tension between the express preemption clause200
and the savings clause has made interpretation of the savings clause
thorny,  most courts have easily concluded that state statutes limiting201
subrogation and reimbursement are laws regulating insurance.  In Levine202
v. United Healthcare Corp.,  however, the Third Circuit found that a203
New Jersey statute prohibiting subrogation and reimbursement was not a
law regulating insurance.  In so finding, the Third Circuit misapplied the204
new test established by the Supreme Court in Kentucky Association of
Health Care Plans, Inc. v. Miller  for determining whether a state law205
regulates insurance.206
Prior to Miller, the Court used a two-pronged approach to identify laws
regulating insurance. First, the Court considered whether the law at issue
regulated insurance under a “common-sense view.”  Second, it weighed207
the three factors used to determine whether the practice at issue constitutes
the “business of insurance” under the McCarran-Ferguson Act (MFA),
which exempts “the business of insurance” from federal antitrust
regulation. Those three factors are (1) whether the practice transfers or
spreads risk, (2) whether the practice is integral to the relationship between
29
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208. Id. 
209. Miller, 538 U.S. at 339–40. The MFA exempts the business of insurance from federal
antitrust regulation as long as the state has undertaken to regulate the business of insurance. 15
U.S.C. § 1012(b) (2006). For cases in which the Court applied the MFA factors to determine
whether the antitrust exemption applied, see Union Labor Life Insurance. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S.
119, 122 (1982), which determined “whether the alleged conspiracy [was] exempt from federal
antitrust laws as part of the ‘business of insurance’” and Group Life & Health Insurance. Co. v.
Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205, 207–08 (1979), which determined whether agreements between
insurers and pharmaceuticals to fix prices constituted the business of insurance for purposes of the
exemption from federal antitrust legislation.
210. Miller, 538 U.S. at 339–40.
211. Id. at 342.
212. See Russell Korobkin, The Battle Over Self-Insured Health Plans, or “One Good
Loophole Deserves Another,” 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y, L. & ETHICS 89, 90 (2005); Larry J.
Pittman, A Plain Meaning Interpretation of ERISA’s Preemption and Saving Clauses: In Support
of a State Law Preemption of Section 1132(a) of ERISA’s Civil Enforcement Provisions, 41 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 593, 599 (2004); Matthew O. Gatewood, Note, The New Map: The Supreme Court’s
Guide to Curing Thirty Years of Confusion in ERISA Savings Clause Analysis, 62 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 643, 673–74 (2005); see also Prudential Ins. Co. v. Nat’l Park Med. Ctr., Inc., 413 F.3d
897, 911 (8th Cir. 2005) (court had decided that an Arkansas statute did not regulate insurance but
then reversed itself based on the Supreme Court’s intervening decision in Miller).
213. See Gatewood, supra note 212, at 674.
214. Id. The law at issue does not have to directly transfer risk or “alter or control the actual
terms of insurance policies.” Miller, 538 U.S. at 338. Instead, the law only has to affect the risk
pooling arrangement. Id. Risk pooling, which refers to an insurer’s act of insuring many similar
insureds in a single pool in an attempt to decrease the variance in the insurer’s expected loss, is
arguably a broader concept than risk transfer, which refers to the act of transferring risk from the
insured and insurer, and (3) whether the practice is limited to the insurance
industry.208
Acknowledging that its use of the MFA factors had confused, rather
than clarified, the inquiry, the Court in Miller abandoned its use of the
MFA factors for determining whether a state law regulates insurance.209
The Court explained that the MFA focuses on whether practices constitute
the business of insurance for purposes of antitrust regulation, while ERISA
asks whether a state law regulates insurance for purposes of ERISA
preemption.210
Under the new test articulated in Miller, a state law regulates insurance
if it is “specifically directed toward entities engaged in insurance” and it
“substantially affect[s] the risk pooling arrangement between the insurer
and the insured.”  The Miller test supports a much broader interpretation211
of the savings clause and arguably gives states a greater ability to regulate
insurance.  To be saved from preemption under the new test, a state law212
only has to be specifically directed at the insurance industry, rather than
be limited to the insurance industry, as required by one of the MFA
factors.  In addition, a law does not have to directly spread policyholder213
risk as required by another MFA factor; it only has to substantially affect
the risk-pooling arrangement.  214
30
Florida Law Review, Vol. 61, Iss. 1 [2009], Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol61/iss1/2
2009] APPLYING THE COMMON FUND DOCTRINE 85
insured to the insurer. See Gatewood, supra note 212, at 674–75; Matthew G. Vansuch, Note, Not
Just Old Wine in New Bottles: Kentucky Ass’n of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller Bottles a New Test
for State Regulation of Insurance, 38 AKRON L. REV. 253, 286 (2005). 
215. For example, Georgia’s statute provides that a “benefit provider” may only obtain
reimbursement when the insured’s recovery “exceeds the sum of all economic and noneconomic
losses incurred as a result of the injury,” requires that the provider’s recovery be reduced “by the
pro rata amount of the attorney's fees and expenses of litigation incurred by the injured party in
bringing the claim,” and defines “benefit provider” as 
any insurer, health maintenance organization, health benefit plan, preferred
provider organization, employee benefit plan, or other entity which provides for
payment or reimbursement of health care expenses, health care services, disability
payments, lost wage payments, or any other benefits under a policy of insurance
or contract with an individual or group.
GA. CODE ANN. § 33-24-56.1(a)–(b) (2008).
216. 498 U.S. 52 (1990).
217. Id. at 60–61.
218. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-79-146 (2008) (within chapter 79, “Insurance Policies,”
of Title 23, “Public Utilities and Regulated Industries”) GA. CODE ANN. § 33-24-56.1 (2008)
(within Title 33, “Insurance”); MINN. STAT. § 62A.095 (2008) (within Chapter 62A, “Accident and
Health Insurance”); see also Smith v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 466 F. Supp. 2d 1275, 1291 (N.D.
Ga. 2006) (observing that Georgia’s anti-subrogation statute “is located within Title 33, Georgia’s
Insurance Code”). 
219. Ky. Ass’n of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller, 538 U.S. 329, 338 (2003).
220. 335 F.3d 278 (4th Cir. 2003).
221. Id. at 286 (citing Miller, 538 U.S. at 342); see also Med. Mut. of Ohio v. DeSoto, 245
F.3d 561, 574 (6th Cir. 2000); Smith, 466 F. Supp. 2d at 1291.
222. 402 F.3d 156 (3d Cir. 2005).
Under the first prong of Miller, state statutes prohibiting or limiting
subrogation and codifying the common fund doctrine are clearly directed
towards the insurance industry. The terms of many such statutes explicitly
apply to insurers.  As the Court held in FMC Corp. v. Holliday,215 216
decided before Miller, anti-subrogation statutes control the terms of
insurance policies and are clearly aimed at the insurance industry.  In217
addition, many such statutes are located in the chapter or title of the state
code dealing with insurance.  218
Under the second prong of Miller, anti-subrogation statutes
“substantially affect the risk-pooling arrangement between the insurer and
the insured” because they determine the ultimate net benefit to which the
participant is entitled.  As the Fourth Circuit noted in Singh v. Prudential219
Health Care Plan, Inc.,  “it is difficult to imagine an anti-subrogation220
law of this type as anything other than an insurance regulation, as it
addresses who pays in a given set of circumstances and is therefore
directed at spreading policyholder risk.”221
In Levine v. United Healthcare Corp.,  however, the Third Circuit222
misapplied the Miller test. The New Jersey statute at issue altered the
traditional collateral source rule by prohibiting a plaintiff in a tort lawsuit
31
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223. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-97 (2008). 
224. Perreira v. Rediger, 778 A.2d 429, 439–40 (N.J. 2001).
225. Id. at 434. 
226. Id. at 435–36. 
227. Id. at 436.
228. Levine v. United Healthcare Corp., 402 F.3d 156, 165–66 (3d Cir. 2005). 
229. Ky. Ass’n of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller, 538 U.S. 329, 332, 334–36 (2003) (finding that
the “Any Willing Provider” statute at issue was directed towards insurers even though it also
necessarily impacted health care providers by prohibiting certain relationships with insurers); Rush
Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 372 (2002) (“[T]here is no reason to think Congress
would have meant such minimal application to noninsurers to remove a state law entirely from the
category of insurance regulation saved from preemption.”). The Miller Court held that laws
applicable to self-insured and insured plans are nevertheless laws regulating insurance because any
other interpretation would render the deemer clause superfluous. Miller, 538 U.S. at 336 n.1.
230. Levine, 402 F.3d at 165–66.
231. 481 U.S. 41 (1987).
232. Id. at 50 (emphasizing that any tortious breach of contract could lead to the award of
punitive damages under state law).
from recovering damages for injuries for which the plaintiff had previously
received compensation from a collateral source.  The New Jersey223
Supreme Court had previously construed the statute to prohibit insurers
from seeking subrogation and reimbursement.  In doing so, the court224
noted that, beginning in the mid-1980s, many state legislatures altered the
traditional collateral-source rule in an attempt to remedy the liability
insurance crisis.  The court held that the statute was enacted to limit225
double recovery by plaintiffs and thereby contain spiraling liability
insurance premiums.  The court further concluded that the New Jersey226
Legislature purposefully chose to benefit the liability insurance industry,
rather than the health insurance industry, when it altered the traditional
collateral-source rule and prohibited subrogation and reimbursement.  227
The Third Circuit’s holding that the New Jersey statute was not a law
regulating insurance was based on its finding that the law was not
specifically directed towards the insurance industry, given that the statute
applied to all civil actions, including actions in which the collateral source
may not have been an insurance company.  The Third Circuit failed to228
appreciate that a law regulates insurance if its primary aim is at
insurers—even if it also applies to other entities.229
The Third Circuit likened the New Jersey statute at issue to
Mississippi’s bad faith law.  In an early savings clause case, Pilot Life230
Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux,  the Supreme Court found that Mississippi’s231
bad faith law does not regulate insurance because it is not “specifically
directed toward [the insurance] industry” and is rooted “in the general
principles of Mississippi tort and contract law.”  In arguing that the New232
Jersey statute was a law of general application in the same way that
Mississippi’s bad faith law generally applies to tort and contract cases, the
Levine court completely discounted the New Jersey Supreme Court’s
ruling that the statute was enacted to contain the cost of liability insurance
32
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233. Levine, 402 F.3d at 169–70 (Garth, J., dissenting).
234. See FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 60–61 (1990); Med. Mut. of Ohio v. DeSoto,
245 F.3d 561, 573 (6th Cir. 2001).
235. 510 U.S. 86 (1993).
236. Id. at 97 & n.7 (referring to N.Y. INS. LAW § 4224(a)(1) (McKinney 1985)).
237. Id. at 97 (omissions in original) (citing ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)).
238. Id. at 99 (quoting Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248 (1984)).
239. Id. For arguments against implied preemption of state insurance regulation, see generally
Donald T. Bogan, ERISA: The Savings Clause, §502 Implied Preemption, Complete Preemption,
and State Law Remedies, 42 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 105 (2001) and Pittman, supra note 212.
240. 526 U.S. 358 (1999).
241. Id. at 366–77. 
by shifting the responsibility for medical expenses in tort cases from
liability insurers to health insurers.  Clearly, a law that alters the233
traditional collateral source rule and prohibits subrogation and
reimbursement for the purpose of containing the cost of liability insurance
is a law directed at insurers.  Contrary to the Levine court’s finding, state234
statutes prohibiting or limiting subrogation, including any such state laws
which also codify the common fund doctrine, are state laws regulating
insurance.
2.  The Implied Preemption Override
In a recent line of cases, the Supreme Court has held that state
insurance laws that fall within the savings clause may nevertheless be
impliedly preempted. In John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co. v.
Harris Trust & Savings Bank,  the Court addressed a conflict between a235
state law requiring “an insurer, in managing general account assets, ‘to
consider the interests of all of its contractholders, creditors and
shareholders’”  and ERISA, which requires that fiduciaries act “‘solely236
in the interest of the participants and their beneficiaries and . . . for the
exclusive purpose of . . . providing benefits to participants and
beneficiaries.’”  Rather than determining that the state law controlled237
because it was saved from preemption as a law regulating insurance, the
Court held that the state law regulating insurance was impliedly preempted
because it “‘stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the full
purposes and objectives of Congress.’”  In finding that the state law must238
yield to ERISA, the Court relied on the Supremacy Clause and held that,
despite the clear language contained in the savings clause, Congress did
not intend to “fundamentally . . . alter traditional preemption analysis.”239
In two later cases, however, the Court appeared to restrict the scope of
implied conflict preemption of a state law regulating insurance. In UNUM
Life Insurance Co. of America v. Ward,  the Court held that California’s240
notice-prejudice rule relates to an employee benefit plan but was saved
from preemption because it is a law regulating insurance.  The Court then241
rejected UNUM’s alternative argument that even if the notice-prejudice
33
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242. Id. at 375–76.
243. Id. at 376 & n.6.
244. 536 U.S. 355 (2002). 
245. Id. at 359–61.
246. Id. at 366–70.
247. Id. at 375.
248. For discussion of Pilot Life, see supra notes 126–27, 227–28, and accompanying text.
249. For discussion of Taylor, see supra notes 137–43 and accompanying text.
250. For discussion of Ingersoll-Rand, see supra notes 124–30 and accompanying text.
251. Rush Prudential HMO, Inc., 536 U.S. at 375–76. Although the Court relied upon the cited
cases to support the proposition that a law saved from preemption because it regulates insurance
can nevertheless be preempted if it conflicts with the purposes of ERISA, none of the cited cases
involved a state law regulating insurance and therefore none clearly provide support for the type
of implied override recognized by the Court. Nor did the Court address the provision in the
McCarran-Ferguson Act that prohibits finding any state law regulating the business of insurance
impliedly preempted by federal law. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (2006).
252. Rush Prudential HMO, Inc., 536 U.S. at 379.
253. Id. at 387.
254. Id.
rule falls within the savings clause, it was nevertheless impliedly
preempted because it directly conflicted with terms of the plan.  The242
Court observed that finding such implied preemption would strip the
savings clause of its effect because insurers would be able to avoid any
state regulation of insurance simply by including contrary language in
ERISA plans.  243
In Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran,  the Court examined an244
Illinois statute requiring HMOs to provide people denied benefits with a
right to an independent medical review of the denial.  After finding that245
the state law regulated insurance,  the Court then turned to Rush’s246
alternative argument that the law was nevertheless impliedly preempted.247
The Court suggested that state insurance laws providing alternative
remedies to those authorized by ERISA would be impliedly preempted and
cited Pilot Life,  Taylor,  and Ingersoll-Rand  as examples of cases in248 249 250
which the Court found preemption based on Congress’s apparent intent
that the civil enforcement remedies provided in § 502(a) be exclusive.251
The Court then distinguished these earlier cases by concluding that the
regulatory scheme providing for an independent medical review did not
provide a new cause of action or authorize a new form of ultimate relief.252
The Court characterized the Illinois law as “garden variety [state]
insurance regulation” seeking to limit insurers’ ability to mandate policy
terms favorable to their own interest, even though the law clearly
minimized plan sponsors’ ability to shield benefit denials from scrutiny.253
“It is . . . hard to imagine a reservation of state power to regulate insurance
that would not be meant to cover restrictions of the insurer’s advantage in
this kind of way.”  254
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255. 542 U.S. 200 (2004).
256. Id. at 204.
257. Id. at 217–18.
258. The deemer clause exempts self-funded plans from state insurance regulation. Metro. Life
Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 747 (1985); see, e.g., Culp, Inc. v. Cain, 414 F. Supp. 2d
1118, 1129–30 (M.D. Ala. 2006) (holding that Alabama’s insurance law requiring a subrogated
insurer to pay a pro rata share of the attorneys’ fees does not apply to self-funded plans); Admin.
Comm. of Wal-Mart Assocs. Health & Welfare Plan v. Willard, 302 F. Supp. 2d 1267, 1282–84
(D. Kan. 2004) (finding that a Kansas anti-subrogation regulation does not apply to self-funded
plans). The discrepancy between insured and self-funded plans makes it possible for self-funded
plans to skirt state insurance regulation even though self-funded plans are engaged in the business
of insurance in the sense that self-funded plans accept and retain the risk that participants will need
health care coverage. For an argument as to how this discrepancy might be ameliorated, see
Korobkin, supra note 212, at 91.
In Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila,  the Court addressed two consolidated255
cases in which individuals had sued their HMOs in state court alleging that
their HMOs had violated a Texas statute by failing to exercise ordinary
care when making coverage decisions.  In responding to the plaintiffs’256
argument that the Texas statute giving rise to their claim was saved from
preemption because it regulated insurance, the Court held that even if the
state law authorizing such claims regulates insurance, it is impliedly
conflict preempted because it “provides a separate vehicle to assert a claim
for benefits outside of, or in addition to, ERISA’s remedial scheme.”257
These cases suggest that state insurance law may be impliedly
preempted only when the state law conflicts with an ERISA provision or
authorizes a state law claim within the scope of § 502(a). Based on these
precedents, state laws that regulate insurance by prohibiting or limiting
reimbursement and subrogation and requiring application of the common
fund doctrine are not impliedly preempted by ERISA for two reasons.
First, they do not conflict with any provision of ERISA. Second, they do
not obstruct ERISA’s exclusive enforcement mechanism because they do
not provide a plan participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary with a separate
vehicle to assert claims. Instead, such state laws will apply to plans’ claims
brought under § 502(a)(3) in the same way that California’s notice-
prejudice rule and Illinois’ statute requiring an independent medical
review apply to claims for benefits brought pursuant to § 502(a)(1)(B).
Thus, insurance statutes codifying the common fund doctrine apply to a
plan’s § 502(a)(3) claim for reimbursement or subrogation.
VI.  CONSTRUING “APPROPRIATE EQUITABLE RELIEF” AS RELIEF
CONSISTENT WITH THE COMMON FUND DOCTRINE
Given that many plans are self-funded and therefore may escape
application of state insurance regulation applying the common fund
doctrine,  it is necessary to examine whether federal law requires258
application of the common fund doctrine to § 502(a)(3) claims for
35
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259. See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. Assocs.’ Health & Welfare Plan v. Wells, 213 F.3d 398,
402–03 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that the federal common law of contracts requires application of
the common fund doctrine as a default rule when the plan is silent on the issue and does not give
the plan administrator discretion to interpret the plan); Waller v. Hormel Foods Corp., 120 F.3d
138, 141–42 (8th Cir. 1997) (same). Most courts will defer to the administrator’s or fiduciary’s
interpretation of ambiguous plan provisions if the plan gives the administrator or fiduciary
discretion to interpret the plan. See, e.g., Moore v. CapitalCare, Inc., 461 F.3d 1, 11 (D.C. Cir.
2006) (holding that if plan language gives the administrator or fiduciary discretion to interpret the
plan, then interpretation of ambiguous plan language will be reviewed for abuse of discretion). But
see Cagle v. Bruner, 112 F.3d 1510, 1522 (11th Cir. 1997) (holding that the plan cannot avoid the
default rule supplied by federal common law simply by giving itself discretion to interpret plan
provisions).
260. ERISA § 502(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (a)(3) (2006).
261. See, e.g., Bombardier Aerospace Employee Welfare Benefits Plan v. Ferrer, Poirot and
Wansbrough, 354 F.3d 348, 360–61 (5th Cir. 2003) (refusing to apply the common fund doctrine
where the plan provided that attorneys’ fees and costs were the responsibility of the plan
participant); Admin. Comm. of the Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. Assocs.’ Health & Welfare Plan v. Varco,
338 F.3d 680, 691–92 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding that federal common law governing contract
interpretation imports the common fund doctrine only when the plan is silent on the issue); Harris
v. Harvard Pilgrim Health Care, Inc., 208 F.3d 274, 278–79 (1st Cir. 2000) (holding that federal
common law does not require “importation of the common-fund doctrine into an otherwise
unambiguous ERISA plan” even when the plan does not directly address attorneys’ fees); Walker
v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 159 F.3d 938, 940–41 (5th Cir. 1998) (finding that federal common law
does not require application of the common fund doctrine in cases where the plan requires full
reimbursement but does not mention attorneys’ fees); United McGill Corp. v. Stinnett, 154 F.3d
168, 172–73 (4th Cir. 1998) (refusing to apply the common fund doctrine to override the plan’s
claim for full reimbursement even though the plan did not specifically address attorneys’ fees);
Health Cost Controls v. Isbell, 139 F.3d 1070, 1072 (6th Cir. 1997) (acknowledging that federal
common law might apply to assist in contract interpretation, but holding that resort to federal
common law is not necessary where the plan language expressly requires full reimbursement);
Ryan ex rel. Capria-Ryan v. Fed. Express Corp., 78 F.3d 123, 127–28 (3d Cir. 1996) (refusing to
find that federal common law governing contract interpretation requires application of the common
fund doctrine where the plan language requires full reimbursement only in the event the insured’s
recovery is great enough to fully reimburse the plan and pay the attorneys’ fees and costs incurred).
262. After Sereboff, the Eighth Circuit rejected the argument that “appropriate equitable relief”
is relief consistent with the made-whole rule. Admin. Comm. of the Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. Assocs.’
reimbursement or subrogation. Federal common law governing contract
interpretation might require the application of the common fund doctrine
as a default rule if the language of a particular plan is silent on the issue.259
Alternatively, federal law might require application of the common fund
doctrine because § 502(a)(3) requires that any award of equitable relief be
“appropriate.”  In other words, “appropriate equitable relief” could be260
interpreted to be relief consistent with equitable principles such as the
common fund doctrine. 
Although several courts have addressed whether federal common law
governing contract interpretation requires application of the common fund
doctrine,  few, if any, have specifically analyzed whether such261
incorporation is mandated by the ERISA provision limiting a plan’s
recovery to “appropriate” equitable relief.  In Sereboff, the Court refused,262
36
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Health & Welfare Plan v. Shank, 500 F.3d 834, 837–39 (8th Cir. 2007). There, the court found that
full reimbursement to the plan was “appropriate.” Id. at 840. The court did not address application
of the common fund doctrine.
263. Sereboff v. Mid Atl. Med. Servs., Inc., 547 U.S. 356, 368–69 & n.2 (2006).
264. 516 U.S. 489 (1996).
265. Id. at 494–95.
266. Id. at 495.
267. Id. at 508–09.
268. Id. at 512.
269. Id. at 515 (citation omitted).
270. Id.
271. Id. (“We are not aware of any ERISA-related purpose that denial of a remedy would
serve.”). 
272. 530 U.S. 238 (2000). 
273. Id. at 253 (recognizing the “appropriate[ness]” criterion in § 502(a)(3)). 
on procedural grounds, to address the argument that “appropriate equitable
relief” is equitable relief consistent with equitable doctrines such as the
common fund doctrine.263
In Varity Corp. v. Howe,  the Court considered the manner in which264
the term “appropriate” limited the equitable relief authorized by
§ 502(a)(3).  There, the Court addressed whether claims brought by plan265
participants for individual relief for breach of fiduciary duty constituted
claims for “appropriate equitable relief” pursuant to § 502(a)(3).  The266
accused fiduciary argued that individual relief for breach of fiduciary duty
was not appropriate under § 502(a)(3) because § 502(a)(2) was intended
to address claims for breach of fiduciary duty and § 502(a)(2) only
authorized relief for the plan, not individuals.267
The Court rejected this argument, finding that Congress intended
§ 502(a)(3) to provide a catchall remedy for violations not elsewhere
addressed in § 502.  In finding that § 502(a)(3) authorized the individual268
claims, the Court held: “We should expect that courts, in fashioning
‘appropriate’ equitable relief, will keep in mind the ‘special nature and
purpose of employee benefit plans,’ and will respect the ‘policy choices
reflected in the inclusion of certain remedies and the exclusion of
others.’”  The Court acknowledged that federal trial courts have a role to269
play in “fashioning ‘appropriate’ equitable relief” designed to further the
purposes of ERISA and suggested that denial of an equitable remedy
might be “appropriate” in some circumstances.  The Court then found the270
particular relief sought “appropriate” because ERISA authorized no other
remedy to redress the beneficiary’s injury and denial of a remedy would
not serve any ERISA-related purpose.  271
In Harris Trust & Savings Bank v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc.,  the272
Court again recognized that the term “appropriate” limits the equitable
relief authorized by § 502(a)(3).  There, the trustee of a pension plan273
sued its broker-dealer, a nonfiduciary party in interest, alleging that the
37
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274. Id. at 242–43.
275. Id. 
276. Id. at 250–51.
277. Id. at 245.
278. Id. at 246–49.
279. Id. at 250.
280. Id. 
281. Id. at 252–53. In so holding, the Court analogized the plan trustee’s claim against the
nonfiduciary broker-dealer to a trust beneficiary’s restitution claim against a third-party transferee
who received trust assets with actual or constructive knowledge that the assets were transferred in
breach of the trust. Id. at 250–51.
282. See DOBBS, supra note 29, § 2.5, at 123. Arguably, all § 502(a)(3) claims concern rights
recognized at law because all such claims must be for the purpose of ensuring enforcement of plan
terms or redressing a violation of plan terms. 
283. See id. at § 2.4(5), at 108.
broker-dealer participated in a financial transaction prohibited by ERISA
when the broker-dealer sold its interest in several motel properties to the
plan.  Upon discovering that the motel properties were almost worthless,274
the trustee sued the broker-dealer for restitution of the purchase price with
interest.  The broker-dealer argued that because ERISA does not impose275
duties on nonfiduciaries, it had not violated any duty expressly imposed
by ERISA, thereby making the § 502(a)(3) claim “inappropriate.”  The276
Court rejected this argument, finding that § 502(a)(3) “itself imposes
certain duties[.]”277
In addition, the Court observed that Congress purposefully delineated
which plaintiffs could bring a § 502(a)(3) claim but did not limit the
categories of defendants against whom § 502(a)(3) claims may be
asserted.  The broker-dealer suggested that if fiduciaries were permitted278
to bring § 502(a)(3) claims against nonfiduciaries for breach of alleged
duties outside the scope of ERISA, there would be nothing to stop
fiduciaries from suing innocent parties with no connection to the unlawful
act or practice.  The Court responded by pointing out that the limitation279
in § 502(a)(3), requiring that the relief sought not only be equitable but
also “appropriate,” would bar such claims.  The Court held that the280
equitable relief sought by the plan trustee was “appropriate” because it was
consistent with “common-law remedial principles”  incorporated into
§ 502(a)(3).281
The Court’s interpretation of “appropriate” is consistent with several
longstanding principles of equitable relief. First, the Court’s holding in
Varity that the equitable relief sought was “appropriate” because there was
no other adequate remedy consistent with the general rule that equitable
relief based on a right recognized at law should be denied if the plaintiff
has an adequate remedy at law.  Second, the Court’s recognition in282
Varity that a court has discretion to fashion and even deny a remedy is
consistent with the discretion long exercised by equity courts.  In light283
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284. See supra notes 74–79 and accompanying text.
285. See Amber M. Anstine, Comment, ERISA Qualified Subrogation Liens: Should They be
Reduced to Reflect a Pro Rata Share of Attorney Fees?, 104 DICK. L.REV. 359, 375–76 (2000)
(“Courts are troubled by the harsh standard set against beneficiaries who are trying to reduce
subrogation liens to reflect a plan’s pro rata share of attorney fees.”); see, e.g., Silcott v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc. Assocs. Health & Welfare Plan, No. 97-7044, 1998 WL 422032, at *6 (E.D. Pa. July
24, 1998) (observing the seeming unfairness of requiring the plan participant to pay the entire
amount of fees); IBP, Inc. v. Foust, 987 F. Supp. 714, 719 (N.D. Iowa 1997) (observing that
application of the common fund doctrine would be both equitable and appealing, but refusing to
apply the doctrine because of governing precedent). Justice Stevens expressed concern during oral
argument in Sereboff that it wasn’t equitable to allow the plan to fully recover when the plan
participant does not fully recover and recovers only slightly more than the reimbursement claim
amount. Transcript of Oral Argument at 30–32, Sereboff v. Mid Atl. Med. Servs., Inc., 547 U.S.
356 (2006) (No. 05-260).
286. Some courts have recognized the need to exercise discretion when awarding such relief.
See, e.g., Smith v. Wal-Mart Assocs. Group Health Plan, No. 99-6464, 2000 WL 1909387, at *4
(6th Cir. Dec. 27, 2000) (holding that courts must be mindful of potential inequities when deciding
§ 502(a)(3) claims); Carpenter v. Modern Drop Forge Co., 919 F. Supp. 1198, 1206 (N.D. Ind.
1995) (holding that “the inherent and equitable authority of the court to determine what is fair”
authorized the court to apply the common fund doctrine).
287. If the common fund doctrine is not applied, it is possible that the lawyer will not be paid
at all. See, e.g., Walker v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 159 F.3d 938, 939–41 (5th Cir. 1998).
288. See Scholtens v. Schneider, 671 N.E.2d 657, 665 (Ill. 1996).
of the Court’s opinions in Varity and Harris Trust, it is clear that the term
“appropriate” limits the equitable relief that would otherwise be available
pursuant to § 502(a)(3). It is also clear that federal courts are to play a role
in fashioning “appropriate” equitable remedies by incorporating common-
law remedial principles into § 502(a)(3) if such principles are consistent
with and serve the purposes of ERISA.
Congress enacted ERISA to protect the interests of plan participants
and their beneficiaries and to improve and assure the equitable nature of
employee benefit plans.  Yet, federal courts’ refusal to apply the284
common fund doctrine to § 502(a)(3) claims for reimbursement or
subrogation thwarts these policies. Federal judges have expressed concern
about the inequitable results reached in cases where the plan is fully
reimbursed and is not required to pay any of the attorneys’ fees or costs
incurred in obtaining the recovery.  Rather than enforcing plan terms285
simply for the sake of enforcement, courts should interpret “appropriate”
as a meaningful limitation on the “equitable relief” authorized by
§ 502(a)(3).  Interpreting “appropriate equitable relief” as relief286
consistent with the common fund doctrine prevents unjust enrichment on
the part of the plan; otherwise plans may free-ride on the efforts of the
attorney.  Such interpretation is also warranted based on the equitable287
principle of quantum meruit, allowing a person to recover the reasonable
value of the services rendered to the plan.  In addition, such an288
interpretation puts substance over form because it recognizes that a claim
for subrogation or reimbursement is in essence an equitable claim—rather
39
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289. Courts have acknowledged that failure to incorporate the common fund doctrine may
cause some beneficiaries to forgo bringing a tort lawsuit against the tortfeasor responsible for
causing the damages. See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. Assocs.’ Health & Welfare Plan v. Wells, 213
F.3d 398, 402 (7th Cir. 2000) (arguing that the “prospect [that a plan will not have to pay its fair
share of attorneys fees] might well deter a suit likely to result in a judgment or settlement not much
larger than the benefits available under the plan—and in that event the language on which the plan
relies would produce undercompensation for harms that were unrelated to the type of harm to which
the benefits pertain”). 
290. Courts have observed that failure to incorporate the common fund doctrine may reduce
a beneficiary’s incentive to sue in certain cases. See, e.g., Harris v. Harvard Pilgrim Health Care,
Inc., 208 F.3d 274, 279 (1st Cir. 2000) (recognizing that plan participants will not have an incentive
to settle when the settlement offer does not exceed the amount necessary to reimburse the plan and
pay attorneys’ fees); Bollman Hat Co. v. Root, 112 F.3d 113, 117 (3d Cir. 1997) (acknowledging
that it is “troublesome” that failure to apply the common fund doctrine may hinder settlements).
291. See, e.g., Admin. Comm. of the Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. Assocs.’ Health & Welfare Plan
v. Varco, 338 F.3d 680, 692 (7th Cir. 2003); Harvard Pilgrim, 208 F.3d at 279; Ryan v. Fed.
Express Corp., 78 F.3d 123, 127–28 (3d Cir. 1996).
292. Silcott v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. Assocs. Health & Welfare Plan, No. 97-7044, 1998 WL
422032, at *6 (E.D. Pa. July 24, 1998) (observing that “beneficiaries have no ability to negotiate
whatsoever” and that “[p]lan providers have sole control of the terms of the plan whether fair or
unfair”).
than a contract claim—that should be governed by equitable principles
such as the common fund doctrine. Interpreting “appropriate equitable
relief” as relief consistent with the common fund doctrine would also
increase a participant’s incentive to sue third-party tortfeasors, thereby
deterring tortfeasors at an appropriate level by holding them liable for all
the damage they cause.  Finally, such an interpretation would also reduce289
some of the current obstacles to settlement of the underlying tort case by
increasing the beneficiary’s share of the recovery by the amount of
attorneys’ fees the beneficiary is no longer required to pay, thereby making
settlement more palatable to the beneficiary.290
Several courts have argued that importation of the common fund
doctrine is not necessary to prevent unjust enrichment because a plan is not
unjustly enriched if the plan language requires full reimbursement to the
plan.  In essence, these courts conclude that plan participants have agreed291
to the plan terms, thereby entitling the plans to full reimbursement. These
courts, however, ignore the reality that plan participants have absolutely
no ability to negotiate the terms of coverage for health care.  Moreover,292
although some might argue that a plan participant impliedly agrees to plan
terms by accepting benefits, a plan participant, such as a child, who is not
a party to the plan and who has no ability to negotiate terms has not
“agreed” to the plan terms in the traditional sense that a party to a contract
agrees to contractual terms. This point is especially true for plan
beneficiaries who are covered because they are the employee’s spouse or
dependent, given that many such beneficiaries may have never even seen
the plan terms. 
40
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293. See, e.g., Bombardier Aerospace Employee Welfare Benefits Plan v. Ferrer, Poirot and
Wansbrough, 354 F.3d 348, 361 (5th Cir. 2003); Varco, 338 F.3d at 692; Harvard Pilgrim, 208
F.3d at 279; United McGill Corp. v. Stinnett, 154 F.3d 168, 172 (4th Cir. 1998).
294. See Baron, supra note 6, at 616–20 (noting that ERISA does not address subrogation or
reimbursement and arguing that reimbursement and subrogation provisions in plan documents
should not be enforced simply “ [b]ecause [the plan] say[s] so”).
295. During the Sereboff oral argument, Chief Justice Roberts asked whether a claim seeking
enforcement of a plan provision requiring double reimbursement would constitute a claim for
appropriate equitable relief. Transcript of Oral Argument at 50–51, Sereboff v. Mid Atl. Med.
Servs., Inc., 547 U.S. 356 (2006) (No. 05-260). In response, the Assistant to the Solicitor General,
arguing for the United States as Amicus Curiae supporting Mid Atlantic Medical Services, Inc.,
acknowledged that such a plan term should not be enforced simply for the sake of enforcement and
suggested that a federal court could refuse to enforce such a provision by determining “a common
law of rights and obligations under ERISA plans” or resorting to doctrines like unconscionability.
Id. 
296. See, e.g., Blue Cross & Blue Shield, Inc. v. Dailey, 687 N.W.2d 689, 699 (Neb. 2004)
(refusing to enforce clear and unambiguous language requiring full subrogation based on
“important equity and policy concerns to the contrary”); York v. Sevier County Ambulance Auth.,
8 S.W.3d 616, 619 (Tenn. 1999) (refusing to enforce clear policy provisions requiring full
subrogation because such enforcement “is not compatible with the principle of fairness that
underlies all equitable doctrines); Hare v. State, 733 So. 2d 277, 284 (Miss. 1999) (observing that
requiring full reimbursement to the insurer simply because the policy so requires “ignores the fact
that this type of contract is realistically a unilateral contract of insurance and overlooks the
insured’s total lack of bargaining power in negotiating the terms of these types of agreements”);
Franklin v. Healthsource of Ark., 942 S.W.2d 837, 840 (Ark. 1997) (making a similar observation).
In a similar vein, other courts have rejected application of the common
fund doctrine when such application is contrary to plan terms, on the
grounds that such application threatens the integrity of the plan and
obstructs ERISA’s goal that plan language control.  Such reasoning,293
however, would suggest that any plan provision is enforceable, regardless
of its equity.  Clearly, that logic cannot prevail. For example, if a plan294
unambiguously requires the plan participant to repay the plan twice the
amount of benefits paid for by the plan, many courts would likely refuse
to enforce such a provision by finding it inconsistent with ERISA’s
primary purpose of protecting plan participants and beneficiaries, or by
finding it inconsistent with the common-law remedial principles that are,
according to Varity, incorporated into § 502(a)(3).295
In non-ERISA cases, many state courts have refused to enforce clear
and unambiguous provisions simply for the sake of enforcement,
recognizing that requiring full reimbursement to the plan or insurer is
inconsistent with and contrary to the equitable principles governing
subrogation and reimbursement.  A leading treatise addressing restitution296
also contends that insurance policy terms entitling the insurer to full
subrogation or reimbursement should not be enforced because of public
policy reasons. 
[Such provisions] are against public policy because the
41
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297. 4 PALMER, supra note 33, § 23.18.
298. See supra note 9 and accompanying text; see, e.g., Admin. Comm. of the Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc. Assocs.’ Health & Welfare Plan v. Shank, 500 F.3d 834, 838 (8th Cir. 2007)
(concluding that if the plan were not fully reimbursed as required by the plan terms, “all other plan
members would bear the cost in the form of higher premiums”); Harvard Pilgrim, 208 F.3d at
280–81 (making a similar argument in support of its rejection of the “make whole” doctrine).
299. See, e.g., JOHN F. DOBBYN, INSURANCE LAW IN A NUTSHELL 384 (4th ed. 2003) (arguing
that subrogation has not reduced insurance rates because “[i]nsurers consistently fail to introduce
the factor of such recoveries into rate-determining formulae, but rather apply such recoveries to
increasing dividends to shareholders”); Aronson, supra note 10, at 284–85; Baron, supra note 6,
at 627–28; David M. Kono, Note & Comment, Unraveling the Lining of ERISA Health Insurer
Pockets—A Vote for National Federal Common Law Adoption of the Make Whole Doctrine, 2000
BYU L. REV. 427, 446–47 (2000). 
normal understanding of a subscriber to the health service
would be that he has purchased the right to payment of his
medical and hospital expenses, when in fact this protection
may be illusory if he is a tort victim, since he may be required
to pay such expenses out of his own assets; that is, out of the
proceeds of his tort recovery for elements of damage which
may be wholly separate from the expenses in question.297
The same policy concerns motivating courts in non-ERISA cases are
present in ERISA cases and do not disappear simply because there is an
interest in enforcing the terms of an ERISA plan. Moreover, ERISA itself
requires that federal courts ensure that any award of equitable relief is
“appropriate.” Clearly, courts have discretion to refuse to enforce plan
terms that are not consistent with long-standing equitable principles,
particularly where enforcement obstructs ERISA’s primary goal of
protecting the interests of participants and beneficiaries. This is not meant
to suggest that courts should readily refuse to enforce plan terms
addressing other issues. Rather, it is meant to suggest that in this limited
context, courts should refuse to enforce plan terms disclaiming the
common fund doctrine because such disclaimer is contrary to
long-standing equitable principles governing subrogation and
reimbursement claims and contrary to the interests of participants and
beneficiaries. 
Another argument made against incorporation of the common fund
doctrine is that such incorporation would greatly increase the cost of
providing benefit plans, which would either discourage employers from
providing plans or be passed down to plan participants through higher
premiums.  Many contend, however, that subrogation and reimbursement298
do not significantly decrease the cost of health insurance because insurers
do not take subrogation or reimbursement into account when calculating
rates.  Even if we assume that subrogation and reimbursement are taken299
into account when calculating rates, fears that application of the common
fund doctrine would cause rates to skyrocket, or even significantly
42
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300. See Brief for Secretary of Labor as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellant’s Petition for
En Banc Rehearing, Qualchoice, Inc. v. Rowland, 367 F.3d 638 (6th Cir. 2004) (No. 02-3614),
2004 WL 3769987, at *13.
301. For every $4.80 the plan recovered, it would be required to pay $1.60 for attorneys’ fees
and expenses. In addition, if the Court were to adopt a clear rule requiring application of the
common fund rule, there would presumably be some savings in litigation cost because it would no
longer be necessary to determine whether state law or federal law requires application of the
common fund doctrine to a § 502(a)(3) claim for reimbursement.
302. See, e.g., Mid Atl. Med. Servs., Inc. v. Sereboff, 303 F. Supp. 2d 691, 697 (2004), aff’d
in part and rev’d in part, 407 F.3d 212 (2005), aff’d, 547 U.S. 356 (2006) (“All recoveries from
a third party (whether by lawsuit, settlement, or otherwise) must be used to reimburse the Company
net of reasonable attorney fees and court costs prorated to reflect that portion of the total recovery
which is due the Company for benefits paid.”).
increase, are not realistic. In 2000, the largest provider of subrogation
services reported that for every one million persons covered by its clients,
it recovered an average of $4.8 million in subrogation.  In other words,300
a plan, on average, recovers $4.80 in subrogation and reimbursement per
covered person per year. Incorporating the common fund doctrine will not
eliminate a plan’s right to recover subrogation or reimbursement; it will
merely require plans to contribute to the attorneys’ fees and expenses
incurred in obtaining the recovery. If we assume that the plan’s share of
attorneys’ fees and costs is 33.3%, application of the common fund
doctrine would only increase the per-person cost of coverage by $1.60
each year.  Moreover, given that some plans explicitly incorporate the301
common fund doctrine and agree to pay a pro-rata portion of the attorneys’
fees and expenses,  application of the common fund doctrine must be302
economically feasible. Finally, even if such application does slightly
increase premiums, it is arguable that most plan participants would be
willing to pay slightly higher premiums to ensure that they are more fully
covered if they are injured in a tragic accident caused by a third-party
tortfeasor. Interpreting “appropriate equitable relief” as relief consistent
with the common fund doctrine in cases where a plan is seeking
subrogation or reimbursement is not only consistent with longstanding
equitable principles but will also ensure that participants and beneficiaries
receive the full extent of coverage expected when they are severely injured
in an accident.
VII.  CONCLUSION
As this Article demonstrates, the courts have failed to uniformly
resolve numerous issues concerning the application of the common fund
doctrine to an ERISA plan’s claim for reimbursement or subrogation.
These issues should be resolved clearly and consistently to give ERISA
plans, plan participants, and plan beneficiaries the ability to predict
and apply the law. More importantly, however, these issues require careful
43
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resolution to ensure that ERISA serves its primary goal of protecting the
interests of plan participants and beneficiaries.
An ERISA plan’s state-law claim for reimbursement or subrogation is
expressly, impliedly, and completely preempted by ERISA because such
a claim “relates to” an employee benefit plan and is inconsistent with the
carefully articulated remedial scheme established in § 502(a) of ERISA.
Thus, § 502(a)(3) is the only mechanism by which a plan may seek
reimbursement or subrogation. State law requiring application of the
common fund doctrine is not preempted by ERISA and therefore applies
to a plan’s § 502(a)(3) claim for reimbursement. State common-law
common fund doctrines are not preempted because they are laws of
general application that do not “relate to” an ERISA plan and do not
obstruct ERISA’s goals. State statutes codifying the common fund doctrine
as part of an anti-subrogation statute are laws regulating insurance and are
therefore saved from preemption. Finally, ERISA itself requires
application of the common fund doctrine because “appropriate equitable
relief” is equitable relief consistent with the common fund doctrine.
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